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INTRODUCTION 
The main topic of this thesis is corruption. In the last twenty years, corruption 
has been a key issue in social scientific research. Therefore the preparation and 
publication of the articles of the current thesis fell into the period of active re-
search on corruption. The reason for such intensified academic interest in this 
topic has been assigned to the end of the Cold War and the shift of attention 
from Communist threat to economic (self-)interest in the Third World (Wil-
liams, 1999a). 
Comparisons between earlier and more recent studies reveal a slight change 
in the variables which have been used to explain corruption. Recently there has 
been more focus on explaining corruption through culture and history, while in 
earlier studies corruption was mostly explained by economic theories (mainly 
principal-agent theory). There is now a search for a new approach to under-
standing and tackling corruption, which is well reflected in the introductory 
article of the special issue dedicated to corruption research in the Journal of 
Public Administration and Development. It calls for a search for an alternative 
approach to tackling corruption through civic education and a change in values 
(Collins, 2012). In this respect, this thesis is also looking for an alternative ap-
proach – it tries to understand the relationship between corruption and trust.  
In particular, the aim of this dissertation is to contribute to the theory of cor-
ruption. It will look at the opportunity structures of corruption, and examine the 
relation between trust and the aspects of corruption. All three articles have 
practical implications for the successful imposition of anti-corruption policy, 
which will be summarized in the concluding chapter of the introduction.  
 
 
Research questions 
I  What is the role of management in establishing anti-corruption organiza-
tional culture in law enforcement agencies? 
II  Which factors influence attitudes towards corruption? 
III  What are the factors influencing punitive attitudes? Do these differ in re-
spect of thieves and corruption offenders? 
 
The purpose of the introductory chapter of this dissertation is to create a theo-
retical framework for analysing corruption, which is accomplished through 
James William Coleman’s integrated theory of white-collar crime, the main 
elements of which are culture and opportunities (Coleman, 1987). The structure 
of the introductory chapter is as follows: after introducing the definition of 
corruption, Coleman’s theory of white-collar crime is presented. This is fol-
lowed by theory of corruption, compiled by the author of the thesis, using the 
framework of Coleman. The research questions of the current thesis are mostly 
related to the opportunity part of the theoretical framework of Coleman. Two of 
the research questions (and respectively, the original articles of the current the-
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sis) focus on the opportunities for corruption that are created in organizations, 
and one spotlights the law and enforcement structure of opportunities. As re-
gards culture, all three studies also look at the issue of trust, more specifically 
trust building in the institutions (I), the second article touches upon institutional 
trust and awareness about corruption (II), and the third article focuses on politi-
cal trust and penal attitudes in respect of corruption offenders and thieves (III). 
The introductory chapter is brought to close by the summary of the findings to 
the research questions, discussion about study limitations and suggestions for 
future research. 
 
 
Methodology  
All three articles are based on empirical studies accomplished by the author of 
the dissertation.  
The article ‘The Role of Management in Tackling Corruption’ uses qualita-
tive methods. The study was based on nine semi-structured in-depth interviews 
with top managers of Estonian law enforcement agencies, which were carried 
out by the author of the study together with Professor Triin Vihalemm and Brit 
Tammiste within the EU commissioned twinning-project ‘Reducing Corruption 
in Estonia’. 
The article ‘Institutional Trust and Opinions of Corruption’ is based on an 
original quantitative survey carried out in the Estonian public sector. The ques-
tionnaire was prepared by the author of the thesis, the survey was commis-
sioned by the Estonian Ministry of Justice and the field-work was carried out by 
TNS-Emor through an online questionnaire.  
The article ‘Trust and Punitive Attitudes’ is based on an original survey car-
ried out by the polling company GfK. The questions were prepared by the au-
thor of the study and the face-to-face interviews took place at the respondents’ 
homes. 
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1. DEFINITION OF CORRUPTION 
Corruption is a crime (Huisman & Walle, 2010), more specifically a type of 
white-collar crime. It has been agreed by criminologists that white-collar crime 
occurs in ‘a legitimate occupational context, is motivated by the objective of 
economic gain or occupational success, and is not characterized by direct, in-
tentional violence (Friedrichs, 2007: 4–5)’. According to the founder of the 
term ‘white-collar crime’, these crimes share a common principle, i.e. violation 
of implied trust (Sutherland, 1940).  
The ambiguity of the concept of corruption has raised concerns since the be-
ginning of anti-corruption research. Some have even claimed that corruption 
has become a concept which denotes all political and administrative difficulties 
(Williams, 1999b). Different definitional types of corruption have been recog-
nised, the most wide-spread are public-office-centred and public-opinion-cen-
tred. The public-office-centred group of definitions are legalistic in their nature, 
as the definition of corruption results from the law and tasks ascribed to the 
official, while the public-opinion-centred group of definitions leaves the public 
to decide what corruption is. A similar distinction runs between sociological 
and legal meanings of corruption – the first one—which takes into account what 
people consider to be corruption—is broader than the latter. For example, a 
patronage can be legal (e.g. appointing one’s party members to the boards of 
foundations established by state), but it violates social norms and in that way 
contradicts the public sense of righteousness (Gerring & Thacker, 2004) and is 
deemed as corruption. In practice, regulations will not be able to account for 
every possible situation that might arise in everyday life, therefore people can-
not rely on legislation to tell them what is acceptable and what is not (II). 
The definition of corruption should not be left to coincidence, but a working 
definition is necessary (Senior, 2004). The most commonly used definition of 
corruption is “misuse of public position for private benefit”. This definition 
refers to the misuse of public position (or authority or office), however there is 
consensus nowadays that corruption affects other sectors as well. Thus the sim-
plest solution is to leave ‘public’ from the definition, and it would read ‘misuse 
of authority for private benefit’. Note that the beneficiary does not have to be 
the corrupter, but could be any other related person. An essential element of 
corruption is the authority of the corrupter or corruptee.  
The borderline between white-collar crime and private corruption is ex-
tremely vague. It can be debated whether Enron, WorldCom, Shell and Parma-
lat are typical examples of private corruption or just cases of white-collar crime. 
In the case of Parmalat, the Italian diary company, its founder, on top of making 
false statements, reportedly used Parmalat’s finances to finance the company 
belonging to his daughter (Singh). If it had been done by a public official, there 
would be no question about defining this act as corruption. Shell, Enron and 
WorldCom used shady accounting and provided false information to hide their 
poor financial situations. If an accountant or a top manager from the public 
sector counterfeited the organization’s accounts and embezzled the money, it 
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would probably be deemed as corruption. The task of defining private sector 
corruption is even more difficult because there is so little information available 
about it. Transparency International has recently started to collect empirical data 
on private-to-private corruption, the findings of which are presented below 
(Transparency International, 2011). Typical examples of private corruption are 
a sales agent bribing a purchasing agent, or an employee favouring a company 
related to family in purchasing goods (Rose-Ackerman, 2007). 
Senior (2004: 23) has come up with five conditions that the definition of cor-
ruption must meet simultaneously: ‘Corruption occurs when a corruptor (1) 
covertly gives (2) a favour to a corruptee or to a nominee to influence (3) ac-
tion(s) that (4) may benefit the corruptor or a nominee; and for which the cor-
ruptee has (5) authority.’ Thus anyone defining corruption can test whether the 
specific behaviour corresponds to these conditions. As for criticism, Senior’s 
definition does not cover situations where there are less than two persons 
involved in the corrupt act, yet in order to overcome this deficiency, corruptor 
and benefiter could be one and the same person. Besides, the prerequisite of 
favour (precondition No 3 according to Senior) in the corrupt act is a matter of 
discussion, as for example situations of nepotism might not be covered by that. 
The majority of available literature on corruption focuses narrowly on ‘po-
litical corruption’, however there are other types of corruption besides the po-
litical corruption, namely administrative or bureaucratic corruption. Although 
not so clear in practice, the distinction between political and administrative 
corruption is based on the Weberian assumption on the separation of politics 
and administration. In many authoritarian systems the boundaries between ad-
ministration and politics are blurred, and even in democracies the boundaries 
are often not that sharp (Bardhan, 2006). Yet, there are several possibilities to 
understand the difference between them. The difference appears to be that po-
litical corruption takes place at the highest levels of political authority, whereas 
bureaucratic corruption appears at the implementation level (Andvig et al, 2000: 
18). Besides, differentiation is made between petty and grand corruption (Niel-
sen, 2003; Carvajal, 1999), the former is attributable to bureaucrats and the 
latter mainly to politicians or the political system. Another way to understand 
the difference between these two types of corruption is to think of their mutual 
influence. In corrupt political system, corruption-free administration is hardly 
possible, while in case of corrupt administration, the political system does not 
necessarily have to be corrupt. This is because political leaders appoint top-
officials, not the other way round. The example of corrupt political system that 
affects administration would be when the party officials appoint judges, prose-
cutors or police who would support their network based corruption (Nielsen, 
2003). This indicates the importance of political will in tackling corruption, as 
the influence of political corruption is broader compared to administrative cor-
ruption. Yet, another way to distinguish between political and administrative 
corruption is via supervision. Politicians are under the scrutiny of public and 
opposition, and they are subject to political competition at certain intervals 
(Bardhan, 2006), while in case of administrative corruption bureaucrats are 
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accountable to their supervisors mainly within the public administration. There 
are different subtypes of political corruption (Karklins, 2005: 6), as well as 
there exist several types of administrative corruption. These include bribery, 
trading in influence, nepotism, patronage, graft, insider trading, etc. All these 
are simultaneously examples of political corruption, while there are specific 
types inherent only to the latter – campaign finance abuse, vote buying being 
just some common examples. 
For the identification of the opportunity structure of white-collar crime, 
theorists encourage to identify specific forms of the crime (Benson et al, 2009). 
Most research on corruption studies bribery and makes generalisations on cor-
ruption. This is because bribes are the most common and best identifiable form 
of corruption (trading in influence is also a form of bribery). Yet, the drivers for 
different types of corruption might be different, which raises concerns about the 
applicability of the theories. Some theorists propose that different political re-
gimes give birth to different type of corruption (Jain, 2001), so creating one 
theory that would entail all explanations of corruption is a challenge. Admitting 
that different types of corruption might require specific opportunities, the gen-
eral theoretical framework for explaining them is the same.  
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2. AN INTEGRATED THEORY OF  
WHITE-COLLAR CRIME 
Corruption theory consists of different fragments – there is no single unifying 
theory. This shortcoming was noticed already in the 1980s, however it is still 
the case nowadays (Johnston, 1983). Corruption scholars have attempted to 
create integrated theories (e.g. Collier, 2002; Nas et al, 1986), but they have so 
far failed to produce a theory comparable to grand theories explaining ordinary 
crime. There are various ways of classification of the causes of corruption, for 
example international, national and individual causes (Khan, 2004); personal, 
institutional and systemic causes (Johnston, 1983); internal, external and indi-
rect causes (Brunetti and Weder; 2003), however all of them have difficulties in 
taking hold of the complexity of the causes of corruption.  
This chapter takes Coleman’s (1987) integrated theory of white-collar crime, 
and adapts it to corruption, creating a theoretical framework for the rest of the 
thesis. Major criminological theories have been used to explain white-collar 
crimes, i.e. anomy, control, rational choice, routine activity theory, crime pat-
tern theory, yet few attempts have been made to create more integrated ap-
proaches to understanding white-collar crime (for overview of these, see 
Friedrichs, 2007). The rationale behind choosing Coleman’s theory to build the 
framework for this thesis lies in its comprehensiveness – it includes individual, 
organizational and cultural explanations of white-collar crimes (Benson & 
Simpson, 2009: 54). This theory allows to embrace results from various empiri-
cal studies from a range of disciplines, thus enabling to draw various theoretical 
pieces on corruption under one umbrella. The separate causes that are attributed 
to corruption by its students cannot solely explain corruption, but only when put 
in conjunction with culture and opportunities related to individuals, organisa-
tions and societal institutions. Coleman’s theory has its weaknesses, for exam-
ple it is almost impossible to empirically test the theory because of an abun-
dance of variables it includes (Benson & Simpson, 2009). Although in respect 
of integrated theories of white-collar crime, there is not much to left aside (for 
example with the exception of Braithewaite, see Friedrichs, 2007), still choos-
ing one grand theory as a standpoint, causes less attention to the other theories. 
However it does not mean that other theories have been completely ignored in 
this thesis. Besides to the fact that Coleman himself integrates elements from 
several theories into one, this introductory chapter complements his theory with 
other theoretical explanations of white-collar crime. 
 
 
2.1. Individual Causes of White-Collar Crime 
Those writing on white-collar crimes have explained deviant behaviour through 
personal traits like egocentricity, irresponsibility, need for control, etc. Most of 
these ‘fall within the range of normal personality types’ which does not single 
out corrupt persons from the rest (Friedrichs, 2007: 201–203). A study con-
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ducted on the US business students showed that low self-control, a trait at-
tributed to white-collar offenders by Gottfredson and Hirchi’s general theory of 
crime, did not affect propensity of corporate offending (Simpson & Piquero, 
2002). Sutherland, the founder of studies in white-collar crimes, also recognised 
the ‘normality’ of white-collar criminals, and he was not convinced that white-
collar crimes were motivated by the Oedipus complex or inferiority complex 
(Sutherland, 1983: 258). In a study of court cases conducted in the US, it was 
demonstrated that a white-collar criminal resembles more an ‘ordinary’ person 
rather than an ‘ordinary’ criminal. For example, the unemployment level of 
white-collar criminals is similar to society’s average, however among “normal” 
criminals, unemployment is much higher. Educational qualifications of white-
collar criminals are better than that of the society, and their income levels are 
similar to the rest of society. When ‘ordinary’ offenders are usually repeat 
criminals (80–90%), recidivism of white-collar criminals is less than 50%. 
(Weisburd et al, 1991: 63–66) Of course, it is worthwhile mentioning that 
white-collar crime, specifically corruption, is a latent crime where all counter-
parts are interested in hiding the criminal act, thus the real recidivism levels are 
probably much higher. When usually criminals are young, white-collar crimi-
nals tend to be older; and among white-collar criminals the share of women is 
bigger than among other criminals. The Estonian statistical data on corruption 
offenders confirms the data provided. According to the pre-court investigation 
data, the average age of people suspected of corruption offence is 40–55 years 
and about 70% are men, while the respective data for ‘ordinary’ criminals are 
18–24 years and about 90% are men (Sööt, 2008). This is because corruption 
stems from social opportunities (II), i.e. positions occupied by men have more 
corrupt opportunities than women; the same applies to opportunities related to a 
person’s age as younger people are not holding positions and occupations with 
corruption opportunities. 
According to the situational crime prevention theory, actions which are eas-
ily justified facilitate white-collar crime (Benson et al, 2009). White-collar 
criminals often use neutralization techniques for normalizing their offences 
(Sykes & Matza, 1979), deeming theft as borrowing, considering bribery as part 
of normal business culture, claiming that everybody is doing it, etc (Coleman, 
1987). 
According to the general strain theory, criminal behaviour can be explained 
by criminals’ experience of strains. The theory says that a person acts crimi-
nally because of different strains and in order to cope with strains, some choose 
deviant paths. Thus, a person’s reaction to a (subjective) strain defines his/her 
behaviour. Different strains trigger different crimes, and white-collar crimes are 
associated with work-related, status-related and economic strains (Agnew et al, 
2009: 38). For example, anticipated strain that one may lose benefits accompa-
nied with the current job, may trigger deviant behaviour. It is also believed that 
strains reduce a person’s work commitment and increase work-related crime. 
(Ibid: 46–47) However, not all individuals experiencing strain decide to behave 
delinquently, but those who lack coping skills and have certain personal traits 
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(Agnew et al, 2009: 49). General strain theory has been tested also on bribery 
offenders (Langton & Piquero, 2007). Langton & Piquero (2007) chose con-
victed white-collar criminals in the U.S., and selected indicators of personal 
strain: number of times a person had been married; dangerousness of the neigh-
bourhood where the person was residing; performance at school, etc. Motivators 
of crime were divided between pecuniary and non-pecuniary or personal and 
business. They found that the main motivators of offending are financial con-
siderations, while personal strain did not influence a person’s decision to bribe 
(as a specific form of white-collar crime). Thus it was reasoned that personal 
strains did not account for a person’s decision to become a corruption offender, 
yet they might experience some other type of strain that motivates them to act 
criminally. (Langton & Piquero, 2007)  
As with most theories, they stem from the criticism of already existing theo-
ries, Coleman (1987) criticizes the interactionist theory’s inability to explain 
motivation of white-collar criminals. He summarizes the interactionist theory 
according to which crime is a social construct, defined by the person in relation 
to expectations his or her act can evoke. The meanings that are attached to the 
behaviour and means determine the course of action.  
 
 
2.2. Culture and Opportunities 
The main variables for explaining offending in integrated theories of crime are 
offender’s motivation, possibilities and social control (Huisman & Walle, 
2010). The integrated theory of white-collar crimes focuses on motivation and 
opportunity (Coleman, 1987), social control being part of the opportunity 
structure. Explaining criminal behaviour through opportunities belongs to the 
situational crime prevention theory, closely related to rational choice theory. 
According to the situational crime prevention theory, offenders are rational 
beings who estimate the efforts needed to carry out the offence, calculate the 
risk of detection and potential reward from the offence (Benson et al, 2009). 
They will commit the crime if potential gain from the crime is greater than the 
risk of getting caught. Offenders will also assess the environmental and situa-
tional factors facilitating crime (Ibid.).  
According to the integrated theory of white-collar crimes, the origins of mo-
tivations of white-collar crimes stem from the culture of competition (Coleman, 
1987). Even if opportunities are modest, an extremely competitive environment 
may force businesses to engage in illegal activities. A company can have an 
exemplary ethical organizational culture and moral workers, however when 
‘challenged by the logic of the marketplace’ (Rose-Ackerman, 2007), the com-
pany might still render illegal activities. This view is also shared by Passas 
(1990) who uses anomie theory to explain white-collar crime. According to the 
theory initially developed to explain lower-class crime, deviance is a discord 
between cultural goals and institutional means, e.g. the inability to achieve the 
goals stemming from the American Dream. As organizations and people 
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working in them have to operate in a highly competitive and rent-seeking envi-
ronment, they thrive for organizational and personal profit with any means 
possible, including delinquent ways (Passas, 1990). It also holds similar views 
to those of the Marxist theory, which explains white-collar crime through capi-
talist vices (Newburn, 2007: 386). According to this, the main sources of cor-
ruption are people’s greed and change in the world order that values competi-
tion and individual freedom of choice, objective of which is personal enrich-
ment (Huisman & Walle, 2010).  
However, corruption and other types of white-collar crime existed already 
before the 17th century, the century which Coleman pinpoints as the birth of 
culture of competition. Moreover, there has been white-collar crime, including 
corruption in non-capitalist societies, the Soviet Union being one example of 
systemic corruption. The Bible deems bribe as an unacceptable means of 
achieving ones aims. For example in Psalms 15:5 David sings “He does not 
charge interest when he lends his money. He does not take bribes to testify 
against the innocent” or in Amos 5: 12 the prophet says: “Certainly I am aware 
of your many rebellious acts and your numerous sins. You torment the innocent, 
you take bribes, and you deny justice to the needy at the city gate.” Coleman 
does not deny the existence of the culture of competition before the 17th cen-
tury, yet he insists that it was much weaker force of crime before that time, 
because agricultural societies lacked the surplus wealth inherent to industrial 
societies. Coleman argues that one reason for the spread of culture of competi-
tion lies in the use of money as the medium of exchange. Employees’ insecure 
status due to unstable work relations makes them vulnerable to risks stemming 
from competitive culture. 
In the modern criminological literature opportunities are key elements in ex-
plaining white-collar crimes (see, for example, Benson et al, 2009). Similarly, 
according to the Coleman’s integrated theory, an offence cannot take place 
without an opportunity. When motivation is the subjective urge of offending, 
opportunity forms the objective conditions for it. Attractiveness of the oppor-
tunity depends on the perceived gain of the offence, risks and individual beliefs. 
The opportunities for the white-collar crimes are distributed between law and 
enforcement, industries, organizations and occupations. In the sphere of law 
and enforcement, the would-be offender assesses criminal behaviour in relation 
to the enforcement of sanctions and the severity of the sanctions. In the area of 
industries, the opportunity varies between government and business sectors, and 
in the business sector there are areas more vulnerable to white-collar crime than 
others, depending on the legal environment as well as on the concentration of 
economic activity. As far as organizations are concerned, the opportunities 
depend on the profitability of the organizations, the structure of the organization 
(e.g. multidivisional organizations are conducive to crime due to lack of 
responsibility) and the extent of social control (Coleman, 1987). Speaking of 
social control, peer criminality is a strong predictor of a person’s criminality 
(Menard & Morris, 2011). The offender is influenced by normative factors that 
favour offending (Newburn, 2007: 385). Normalisation of deviant behaviour 
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makes people who would otherwise not act in deviant way to offend (Huisman 
& Walle, 2010). Moreover, each organization has its culture or even subcultures 
(e.g. occupational) that encourage or restrain from offending. Occupational 
subcultures may define behaviour that is condemnable by society as normal 
conduct within their profession, regardless of the organization they are working 
for. With reference to occupations, different statuses in organizations give rise 
to various opportunities. Accountants and bookkeepers have possibilities for 
one type crime, while tendering officials are subject to other types of possibili-
ties. (Coleman, 1987) 
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3. AN INTEGRATED THEORY OF CORRUPTION 
3.1. Culture Conducive to Corruption 
The aim of this chapter is to find out if corruption can be explained via culture. 
One of the most prominent definition of culture is ‘the collective programming 
of the mind that distinguishes one group or category of people from another 
(Hofstede, 2007)’, referring to the collectivist nature of the phenomenon. Alt-
hough culture is much more than the issue of trust, this thesis specifically looks 
at the relation between trust and corruption, which explains the focus on trust in 
the current introduction. Trust is part of culture, or as it has been put by other 
researchers ‘trust is a cultural factor’ (D’Hernoncourta & Méon, 2012: 99). The 
chapter ends with the short analyses about the link between organizational cul-
ture and corruption. 
Coleman’s suggestion about the general competitive and rent-maximizing 
environment which promotes white-collar crime by states, organizations and 
individuals also applies to corruption. A study in India showed that business-
men who engaged in corruption justified this with the need of keeping up with 
the competition (Collins, Uhlenbruck & Rodriguez, 2009). The reason for why 
poorer countries have more corruption (Montinola & Jackman, 2002; Paldam, 
2002; Kearney, 2001) is because in a globally competitive environment 
achieving certain living standards is possible through corruption – a conclusion 
supported by the anomie theory. It also helps to explain why transition states 
have more corruption – societies in rapid change, whose aspirations and possi-
bilities do not coincide, turn corrupt (Huisman & Walle, 2010). 
Although some studies indicate that corruption is a culture-supported phe-
nomenon, still most corruption theories focus on government related activities 
(Leite & Weidmann, 1999), thus indicating that corruption is not a fact one has 
to adapt to but is manipulated by governmental and political actions (Sung, 
2004). Treisman (2000) brings the example of Russia, where the high level of 
corruption is better explained by economic (un)development, federal structure 
of the state and short democracy, which is rather the product of coup d’etat of 
Bolsheviks rather than the fruit of Russian culture. Yet, another author finds the 
exact opposite and explains how corruption has been part of Russian culture and 
political culture since the Russian Civil War (Brovkin, 2003). Some authors 
find that although the level of corruption is seen as a regional phenomenon and, 
therefore states affect each other, still the most important determinants of cor-
ruption are each state’s own economic, cultural and institutional conditions, and 
if these factors are favourable, the state’s level of corruption may differ from 
that of its neighbours (Becker, Egger & Seidel, 2009).  
Hooker (2009) finds that each culture should attain its peculiarities, and the 
rest should accept that business-doing is subject to different sets of principles in 
different cultures – in doing so he acknowledges the cultural traits of corrup-
tion. Such an approach to corruption is considered a revisionist perspective, 
according to which corruption may have a positive influence on a state’s 
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economic and political development, and therefore being morally upright activ-
ity; or pragmatic perspective, which recognizes superiority of local values and 
norms (Waldman, 1974: 13 in Dion 2010: 243). In contrast, according to the 
antagonist perspective, which is prevailing in the theoretical literature, corrup-
tion hinders a state’s economic and political development, it is a negative phe-
nomenon, and morally wrong (ibid.).  
Experimental studies conducted on students indicate that people who come 
from corrupt states would act more corruptly compared to locals. It was found 
in the UK that foreign undergraduate students would act more corruptly, the 
possible reason being that they have had less time to adapt to local (UK’s) 
norms compared to postgraduate students. This leads the authors of the study to 
hypothesize that corruption is a culture-specific phenomenon. (Barr & Serra, 
2010) This opinion is shared by another author who concedes that corruption is 
a cultural phenomenon and reflects how things are done in certain cultures, 
without any understanding by local bureaucrats that things should be done ac-
cording to Western norms (Brovkin, 2003). According to this corruption is as a 
given fact, a natural way of doing business, bribe-paying and cheating are 
deeply rooted in the culture, despite of the judgements of the society.  
There are several dimensions which help to identify culture, i.e. collectivist-
individualist, masculine-feminist, power distance, uncertainty avoidance, long 
term vs short term orientation, indulgence vs restraint (Hofstede, 2007; see also: 
http://geert-hofstede.com/dimensions.html). In respect of corruption literature, a 
line between collectivist and individualist cultures is drawn. According to some 
studies, collectivist cultures are more corrupt (Mazar & Aggarwal, 2011). This 
is because collectivist cultures have more shared responsibilities and people are 
more eager to help one another. However, the opposite point of view is ex-
plained by the assumption that collectivist cultures are less prone to cheat or 
abuse the people due to social pressure and personal ties. Individualist cultures 
value competitiveness, which consequently encourages the usage of grease 
money in order to be ahead of competitors. (Park, 2003) Similar explanations 
have been used in respect of religion and different confessions. It is hypothe-
sized that Protestant countries are less corrupt because of individualistic and 
egalitarian values (Pellegrini & Gerlagh, 2008; Herzfeld & Weiss, 2003). 
Protestant countries’ lower level of corruption is also explained by Protestants’ 
hard-working nature and better economic conditions compared to others. 
Treisman brings in the social control argument, saying that historically 
Protestant churches have developed separately from state power, therefore civil 
society is better formed in these countries. (Treisman, 2000) Marquette states in 
her study that religion does not have any effect on corruption ─ on the individ-
ual level, it is thought that religious people have higher moral principles than 
others, however even if religious people condemn corruption, there is no sense 
for them to act properly in a systematically corrupt society. Motivation to act 
honestly vanishes when people perceive that there is lot of corruption. 
(Marquette, 2012)  
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In order to better explain corruption, Collier (2002) divides political cultures 
into three types: collective, individualist and egalitarian, and says that each of 
them has a different meaning of corruption and different number of corrupt 
incidents. Collective political cultures resemble the collectivist cultures de-
scribed above. In these cultures the most important decision are made inside the 
informal group of people, directed by one dominant group leader or elite group, 
outsiders are not allowed to benefit from the advantages. The rule of law is 
weak in collectivist political cultures and society is dominated by informal 
reciprocity and patronage relationships. In individualistic political cultures 
relations are pragmatic, self-interest is the main driving force behind actions. 
Government positions are acquired for personal needs. Political competition is 
between parties for the rewards accompanying government positions. Society is 
hierarchical, extensive ruling elite in the top, bureaucracy separating elite from 
the mass. In egalitarian type the vast majority of people belong to civil 
associations, and relations between people are through formal as well as 
informal institutions. Egalitarian culture is based on the rule of law and search 
for common interest. With regard to corruption, in collectivist cultures most 
activities are acceptable that are considered corrupt in two other cultures. For 
example, an intervention by the patron for accomplishing administrative process 
is considered normal activity in collectivist political culture and is a common 
way of doing business. In individualist cultures this kind of activity falls within 
the grey area of corruption (different classes of society attribute different 
meaning to the behaviour) and the incidences of this kind are rare, while in 
egalitarian societies this is clear corruption, with only rare incidences. In the 
latter any corrupt behaviour would result in blockages in persons’ access to 
power positions. (Collier, 2002) 
 
 
3.1.1. Trust, Culture and Corruption 
The collectivist-individualist hypothesis is closely related to the issue of trust. 
Definitions of different types of trust (particularised – generalised; bonding ─ 
bridging) and relations between trust and opinions about corruption are ex-
plained in the article ‘Institutional trust and opinions of corruption’ (II) which is 
part of the current thesis. Literature relates corruption and trust in various ways, 
making these two concepts interwoven in the ‘endogenity problems (Nannestad, 
2008: 419)’ or the ‘egg and a chicken’ dispute. The causality of these two phe-
nomena is disputed in theoretical literature. Uslaner (2001) finds that the effect 
of corruption on trust is greater than the effect of trust on corruption, however 
when considering changes in trust and corruption levels, he finds that trust can 
hinder corruption – growing trust levels bring along a decrease in corruption, 
but not the other way round – diminishing levels of corruption do not bring 
along growth in trust levels. In addition there are studies that do not find the 
link between trust and corruption (Tavits, 2010), however these findings do not 
suggest that these two social phenomena cannot be interrelated through more 
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complicated social processes. Below is a summary of possible relations between 
trust and corruption. 
 
1. Trust between people (particularized trust) favours corruption, an example 
of which are clan-based societies where helping each other is more im-
portant than impartial relations. A typical example of this is guanxi (recip-
rocal network of relations) in Asia (Jain, 2001) which fosters corruption. A 
study on Indian businessmen revealed that their close relations with gov-
ernment officials and the reciprocal sense of obligation explained corrupt 
behaviour (Collins, Uhlenbruck & Rodriguez, 2009). The reason why ethi-
cally fragmented societies are more corrupt (Shleifer & Vishny, 1993) is 
because it reinforces particularised trust so that people tend to favour those 
alike (Uslaner, 2001), the same kind of behaviour is taken over by bureau-
crats (Mauro, 1995). Hooker (2009) theorizes that Western culture is rule-
based, while non-Western culture is relationship-based. He says that while 
Westerners trust the system, non-Westerners trust family and friends, and 
therefore corruption manifests itself in different forms in the West and non-
West. In the West it is considered corruption to favour friends in transac-
tions, whereas in other cultures it is a precondition of any transaction, be-
cause friends and family are the only ones who can be trusted. In the end he 
finds that bribery is bad in the Western system, as it brings along the loss of 
trust in the system (Hooker, 2009).  
 
2. Trust between people (generalized trust) diminishes corruption (Rothstein 
& Eek 2009; Uslaner, 2001; Bjørnskov, 2003), as it is difficult to cheat the 
person whom one trusts. It has also been found that interpersonal trust re-
duces shadow economy because people are more likely to behave legally if 
they trust that others act legally as well (D’Hernoncourt & Méon, 2012). 
Moreover, higher interpersonal trust brings along milder punitive attitudes 
towards fellow people because of belief that people are capable of change. 
Besides, those who trust others attribute responsibility of crime to other 
factors than that of bad personality. (III)  
 
3. Trust in state institutions reduces corruption (Collier, 2002). People with 
low levels of trust in political institutions are more permissive in their atti-
tudes to the law and would be more likely to break the law (Marien & 
Hooghe, 2011). People respect the law, if they believe that they are treated 
equally and fairly (Uslaner, 2001). Low trust in political institutions is 
linked to the increased support to tougher anti-corruption measures (i.e. in-
creasing punishments, granting broader investigation rights to the authori-
ties) compared to value-based measures (i.e. awareness-raising) (Johannsen 
& Pedersen, 2012). Institutional trust also affects people’s awareness of 
corruption – those who trust more are better aware of what is corruption and 
what is not, and are more likely to condemn corrupt practices, and are less 
likely to engage in corrupt practices (II). 
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4. Corruption reduces trust in state institutions because it hinders citizens’ 
equal and fair treatment by state institutions, while state institutions become 
the means for achieving personal aims (Chang & Chu, 2006). Corruption 
hampers people’s access to the political process, alienating them from poli-
tics, diminishing confidence in political institutions. Corruption impedes 
economic development and causes government’s ineffectiveness (Rose-
Ackerman, 1999), and therefore makes citizens suspicious and less trusting 
of their governments. Perceptions of institutional performance affect the 
levels of institutional trust (Kim, 2005), so that institutions with a corrupt 
image lose their trustfulness. A study in new democracies showed that peo-
ple living in corrupt countries do not trust civil servants and give a negative 
assessment to political institutions (Anderson & Tverdova, 2003). Rothstein 
& Eek (2009) bring an example of the lost wallet and ask what would be the 
probability of getting one’s wallet back from the police. They answer that 
most probably that would happen in high trusting societies. This is because 
in low trusting societies a person who finds the wallet would not take it to 
the police because he assumes that the police is corrupt and would not re-
turn the wallet to the owner. Thus, the corrupt image (and behaviour) of the 
police shapes opinions about its institutional trustworthiness.  
 
5. Corruption reduces interpersonal (generalized) trust (Seligson, 2002) or as 
Uslaner (2001: 5–6) puts it, ‘corruption tears apart our trust in others’. 
Moreover, confidence in government is thought to increase trust towards 
fellow citizens (Levi & Stoker, 2000). People’s perception of the behaviour 
of public officials is an important determinant on how they view other peo-
ple (Rothstein & Eek, 2009). In the case of low corruption levels, people 
have more confidence in fellow citizens – they trust that others behave ethi-
cally.  
 
To summarize the discussion on corruption, culture and trust, it can be hypothe-
sized that (1) collective political cultures have high levels of particularised 
social trust, low levels of generalised trust and they lack political trust; (2) indi-
vidual political cultures are characterised by low levels of particularised and 
generalised trust but relatively high levels of political or institutional trust; (3) 
in egalitarian political cultures levels of institutional and generalised trust are 
high, while the levels of particularised trust are relatively low. Compared to 
other political cultures, egalitarian is the least corrupt. Consequently, the glob-
ally competitive environment from one side, the urge of responsiveness next-to-
a kin and low political trust from another side, all form a culture which is con-
ducive to corruption. In times of economic pressure, the means of attaining a 
satisfying level of income shrink and, therefore, illicit activities increase 
(Simpson & Piquero, 2002). At the same time, the desire to prefer close 
acquaintances (friends as well as people belonging to one’s political party or 
business circle) in social transactions increases – a fellow in need, is a fellow 
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indeed. However, finally there must be opportunities in order for corruption to 
occur. It has been recognised in earlier studies that cultural factors stemming 
from the communist era and opportunity structures accompanying transition 
from one society to another were the main causes of corruption in post-com-
munist countries (Sandholtz & Taagepera, 2005), thus supporting the explana-
tion of the causes of corruption offered in this introductory chapter of the thesis. 
 
 
3.1.2. Organizational Culture 
Organizational cultures are shaped by broader culture surrounding them. Even 
if organizations operate in the larger competitive culture, each organization has 
its specific culture. Organizational culture has been defined as shared 
understanding of employees about how things are done within an organization 
(Okumus, 2003). It is related to informal norms and human factor (Webb, 
2012). Yet, by another definition organizational culture is its members shared 
perceptions of daily practices or habits (Hofstede et al, 1990). Similarly, with 
the larger explanation about culture and opportunities, organizations can create 
opportunities for corruption, while the culture in organizations creates either 
favourable or inhibiting conditions for corruption. Organizational trust, being 
part of the culture in organizations, has been defined as the mutual expectations 
by the members of organization that other members act according to fair-play 
rules and that the other employees share the same ethical values (Pucetaite et al, 
2010), thus deeming organizational trust as corruption-inhibiting factor of the 
organizational culture.  
The success of the prevention of corruption depends on the ethical climate of 
the organization, which includes ensuring that staff gains a clear understanding 
and knowledge of ethics (Webb, 2012: 107). Yet, the stated values of the or-
ganizations are void in case not shared by the members of organizations in 
practice (Hofstede et al, 1990). Although there is tendency to deem vices such 
as greed, vanity, etc. to be the main cause of corruption, individual characteris-
tics alone are not sufficient to account for a person’s deviant behaviour (I). 
Individualising causes of corruption would be shifting attention away from the 
main causes of corruption (Karklins, 2005; Gould, 1991), still corruption is 
sometimes believed to be the manifestation of greed (Nas et al, 1986) and per-
sonal vices. Although some studies show that men are more disposed to corrup-
tion (Torgler & Valev, 2010), others do not support it (Sung, 2012; Alolo, 
2007). Nevertheless it does not let us conclude that the share of men in an or-
ganization determines the level of corruption. The same goes for greediness. 
Rather, there are organization related aspects that determine the behaviour of its 
members.  
Corruption is a socially learnt activity – the likelihood of engaging in cor-
ruption increases if peers are corrupt (Tavits, 2010) and corruption is seen as a 
normal way of behaviour in organizations (Ashforth & Anand, 2003). The ex-
amples of Enron, Parmalat and other companies caught with fraudulent prac-
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tices testify of the corruption-tolerant organizational culture. Rationalization of 
corruption (people excusing their illegal and wrongful actions to themselves) 
which has become part of the shared understanding of the members of 
organizations paves way to defining corruption as a normal way of doing things 
(Anand, Ashforth, & Joshi, 2004).  
Organizational culture is the focus of the article ‘The Role of Management 
in Tackling Corruption’ of this thesis. The article explains the importance of 
organizational culture and the personal example of managers in establishing an 
anticorruption atmosphere in the organizations (I). It has been shown that good 
communication, information sharing and commitment to honesty in relation-
ships with employees are key ingredients in preventing delinquent behaviour 
and corruption in an organization (Niehoff & Paul, 2000) – yet, these were not 
recognised by any of the managers of the Estonian law enforcement agencies, 
interviewed during the study (I). An adequate reaction to violations instead of 
hiding them is a step forward to building corruption-free organizations (II). 
 
 
3.2. Opportunities for Corruption 
The following chapter contains systemised analysis of the opportunities for 
corruption stemmed from the existing literature and the findings of the current 
thesis.  
Each crime has its specific opportunities (Benson et al, 2009). Opportunities 
for corruption appear to be different from many other crimes because of various 
actors involved in the offence. In other words, an opportunity to commit cor-
ruption offence has to occur by the corrupter and the corruptee at the same time. 
In case of a car theft, the potential offender sees an empty car with a key, 
parked in the parking lot without a guard, and he already has the opportunities 
facilitating crime. In case of corruption, the opportunities stemming from one 
organizational setting might not be sufficient for the offence to take place, 
which makes corruption a complex endeavour. For example, if a businessman 
bribes a local major, both have to have organizational conditions that favour 
corruption, be it either lack of internal audit, crime-supporting organizational 
culture, certain sectoral circumstances or any other element in the opportunity 
structure described below.  
 
 
3.2.1. Law and Enforcement  
Four main elements of law and enforcement influence the opportunities for 
corruption: equal access to the law, judicial independence, law enforcement and 
the probability of getting caught (Jain, 2001). 
Laws that are not consistent with prevailing morals (Carvajal, 1999) and le-
gal norms that do not correspond with social demands create opportunities for 
corruption, as people find ways to buy themselves out and the pressure for 
bribes increases (Nas et al, 1986). The complex and ambiguous regulations that 
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allow multiple interpretations create favourable conditions for corruption and 
legal interpretations of corruption, things are acceptable if they comply with 
legal norms. In countries with abundant state capture – a term invented by the 
World Bank to illustrate systemic corruption – laws are drafted in a way to 
facilitate corruption.  
As for judicial independence, an independent court system is a cornerstone 
of effective anti-corruption policy (UNDP, 2005; Ades & Di Tella, 1997). A 
corrupt judiciary does not fulfil its watchdog role over other branches of au-
thority (Rose-Ackerman, 1999). Collier (2002) suggests that the criminal justice 
system is tied ─ in their hands in the vast majority of the world states and judi-
ciary is often dependent on the executive branch for its budget, and therefore it 
does not hold the ruling elite accountable. 
Law enforcement agencies are among the most important anti-corruption 
agents in society. The cleanness of law enforcement and the structure of legal 
institutions are the main corruption affecting factors (Aaken et al, 2010; Jain, 
2001). A study of prosecutorial independence showed that de facto independ-
ence (indicator comprising of 7 variables that signifies the implementation of 
laws in practice) counted more in reducing corruption compared to de jure in-
dependence (indicator comprising of 22 variables that demonstrate legal princi-
ples of independence, i.e. appointment, promotion, etc.) (Aaken et al, 2010). 
Therefore, in corrupt states the independence of prosecution remains mostly on 
paper, which in turn affects the credibility of the government through the lack 
of independent investigation of corruption of the members of government. Con-
sequently, this destabilises the state as a whole, the outcome of which is less 
investments in the justice system (Ibid.).  
The managerial skills of the managers of the law-enforcement agencies de-
fine the amount of attention paid to tackling high-level corruption (as opposed 
to low-level corruption) in society. (I) Law enforcement agencies have com-
peting priorities between street crime, traffic offences, drugs, and other types of 
crime (Burger & Holland, 2006). Investigating corruption can therefore yield to 
other priorities. This is amplified by the difficulty of investigating corruption 
crimes, as special investigation skills are needed for that. In Estonia, low skills 
and the lack of specialisation has hindered the investigation of corruption 
crimes (the Estonian Anti-Corruption Strategy, 2008–2012). Therefore (but not 
only because of that), some states have created specialised anti-corruption agen-
cies – institutions more often found in less developed countries rather than in 
Western democracies. In a way the creation of such institutions is often a sym-
bolic gesture made by states to demonstrate their willingness to combat corrup-
tion and to respond to international pressure (see also Sousa, 2010). Often these 
institutions render inconsistent results, and it seems that the agency’s ability to 
influence the level of corruption is smaller than that of corruption to be able to 
shape the functioning of the agency. The United Nations, the founder of the 
Anti-Corruption Convention and the promoter of the agencies, finds that there 
are only few examples of successful anti-corruption agencies, which are Hong 
Kong, Singapore, Botswana and New South Wales. Copying the successful 
26 
 
examples is not easy, because of the need to follow the local context (UNDP, 
2005: 5). The success of Singapore and Hong Kong are mostly explained by the 
political will in these countries to tackle corruption (Quah, 2010). According to 
the UN, the success of the anti-corruption agency depends on its independence 
and external scrutiny (UNDP, 2005). Independence means carrying out its 
functions without political interference either through political appointments, 
financial cuts or any other means. Political dependence, poor coordination, poor 
organizational culture, inadequate specialisation are among the main causes of 
institutional malfunctioning of the agencies. (Sousa, 2010) The risk of failure is 
amplified by the weakness of democratic institutions, such as free media, trade 
unions and others (Passas, 2010).  
The effect of punishments on criminal activity is a focus of penology, while 
in respect of corruption it has not gained too much attention. A comparative 
study in the Baltic States demonstrated that increasing punishments for corrup-
tion were among the most desirable and effective anti-corruption tools accord-
ing to the civil servants (Johannsen & Pedersen, 2012). Yet, according to the 
same study there was a connection between the perceived levels of corruption 
and preference for means to curb corruption: harsher punitive feelings were 
evoked by increased levels of perceived corruption (Ibid.). The Estonian study, 
part of this thesis, showed that people would punish corruption offenders more 
severely than ordinary thieves, though variables influencing the choice of sanc-
tions are different in respect of both crimes (III). It occurs in the study that non-
Estonians would like to see corruption offenders to be punished more severely, 
which may be the result of alienation from power. Frustration associated with 
those in power may be reflected in penal attitudes – namely in the wish for 
more incarcerations. (III) 
Elsewhere, it is stated that punishments should not be too lenient and they 
should be systematically imposed (Carvajal, 1999). Jain (2001) mentions the 
enforceability of punishments as one of the three elements in the deterrence of 
corruption besides minimal discretionary power and low economic rents. The 
examples of Singapore and Hong Kong – countries with exemplary low levels 
of corruption – demonstrate that higher punishments discourage corruption 
(Stapenhurst & Langseth, 1997; Ades & Di Tella, 1997), however they come at 
the cost of civil liberties. It is suggested that corruption studies by economists 
have led to recommendations to increase the costs of corruption, i.e. raise pun-
ishments, improve efficiency of law enforcement – propositions that shift atten-
tion away from softer and cultural values (Mazar & Aggarwal, 2011). Gebel 
(2012) reprimands Transparency International for its universalistic approach 
that is characterised by considering humans as rational beings, which in turn 
creates anti-corruption tools that raise economic well-being.  
Another study showed that informal sanctions (e.g. threat of losing one’s 
job) counted more in inhibiting occupational crime (bribery among them) than 
the threat of formal sanctions (Sampson & Piquero, 2002). Trust, internalised 
norms and values rather than punishment and control that help people steer 
clear of wrongdoing and corruption (II). 
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3.2.2. Sectors  
Coleman (1987) speaks of industries which enable different opportunities for 
white-collar crime, yet in respect of corruption it would be more compatible to 
speak about sectors. Sectors are the public, the private and the non-governmen-
tal sector. The health care sector which is deemed corruption risky (for specifi-
cations, see the ‘occupations’ section below), belongs to the private sector in 
most countries, although it uses public funds. It was argued above that highly 
competitive environment creates conditions for corruption. Regardless of the 
type of the organization all have to operate in the same competitive environ-
ment. Although employees working in public organizations do not face the 
same competitive pressures compared to their private counterparts, yet accord-
ing to Coleman (1987), the broader environment forces everyone to pursue 
economic self-interest. Therefore, instead of saying that one sector is more 
corrupt than the other, it would be more correct to deduce that different sectors 
give rise to different kinds of opportunities. Probably the strongest incentives 
for corruption come from the public sector because of the management of pub-
lic money (or because almost nothing is known about private-to-private corrup-
tion). Some authors believe that the private sector through civil lawsuits will 
take the lead in fighting corruption (Burger & Holland, 2006). 
Political system seems to preside over all sectors – it is part of public, non-
governmental, as well as private sector. Democracy is believed to have a cor-
ruption reducing effect, mostly owing to the separation of powers (Paldam, 
2002) and the consolidation of advanced democratic institutions (Sung, 2004). 
In democratic systems, politicians and bureaucrats behave more correctly as the 
likelihood of losing their jobs is bigger (Goel & Nelson, 2010: 436). States with 
longer democracy and stable governments have less corruption as they have had 
time to build up institutions that help to control corruption (Goel & Nelson, 
2010: 439; Pellegrini & Gerlagh, 2008; Treisman, 2000). All processes accom-
panying democratisation help to create anti-corruption culture, i.e. access to 
independent judiciary, citizens’ participation in government, etc. (Doig, 2012). 
Free media acts as a deterrent to corruption (Pellegrini & Gerlagh, 2008; Treis-
man, 2007; Brunetti & Weder, 2003). In case of electoral fraud, freedom of 
speech and free media help to reduce opportunities for corruption. The main 
reason why liberalisation is thought to reduce corruption is because 
liberalisation reveals corruption to the outer world, which brings along 
international pressure to reduce it. According to one explanation, which is at 
odds with Coleman’s (1987) theory on culture of competition, competition as a 
co-product of liberalisation reduces monopolistic rents and therefore possibili-
ties to pay bribes (Baksi et al, 2009: 214). As a result of liberalisation and eco-
nomic development, the roles of private and public sectors are clarified and the 
level of education rises, both of which reduce corruption (Treisman, 2000: 440). 
In the public sector (and any other sector), the key issue is transparency of 
the decision making process. The less is hidden, the less there are opportunities 
for corruption. The matter of transparency is closely related to the level of deci-
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sion making (decentralisation vs centralisation) and accountability. Decentrali-
sation means the redistribution of authority and responsibility to the lower lev-
els of government and to the local authorities in order to perform public func-
tions better. The proponents of the positive effect of decentralisation rely on 
control theories in which the conformity to rules is caused by prevailing norms 
and social bonds (Stark, 1996: 200). They believe that in decentralised settings, 
politicians and bureaucrats are held accountable for their actions through the 
need to maintain a good reputation in a small community – each one wants to 
keep and strengthen his or her position by being honest. This explanation is 
similar with the collectivist-individualist explanation cited earlier, and touches 
again upon the issue of trust between people. Besides, in decentralised settings 
there are institutions of checks and balances with overlapping functions which 
help to control corruption (Gerring & Thacker, 2004). According to the oppo-
site view, decentralised settings are more corrupt due to the lack of resources 
and knowledge and weaker auditing mechanisms on the local level (Goldsmith, 
1999: 872) – an explanation which is often used with regard to Estonian local 
governments. In centralised settings there are clear lines of responsibility. One 
theory proposes that larger countries have more tendencies to become corrupt as 
due to large territory it is difficult to control bureaucrats and, therefore, more 
urbanized settings are less corrupt (Goel & Nelson, 2010:434–444). Moreover, 
in larger countries in respect of territory and population it is more difficult to 
implement and coordinate anti-corruption measures (Quah, 2010).  
According to one study, the clarity of responsibility of political institutions is 
an important determinant of the level of corruption as in the ‘clear system’ it is 
easier for people to associate corruption with a specific trespasser and therefore 
express its opinion in the elections (Tavits, 2007). The study that found corrup-
tion inhibiting nature of unitarism (as opposed to federalism) and parliamentar-
ism (as opposed to presidentialism) on corruption in democratic systems also 
explained it via the decentralisation-centralisation hypothesis (Gerring & 
Thacker, 2004). For example, it argued that in unitarian countries there are 
fewer co-ordination problems in public administration, which makes bureau-
cracy less complex and consequently gives less rise to opportunities for corrup-
tion. 
Meritocratic principles of recruitment and personnel policy are believed to 
have an inhibiting effect on corruption, specifically on nepotism (Brunetti & 
Weder, 2003; Rauch & Evans, 2000), insisting on the reverse impact of the 
elements of the patronage system. (From the personnel management point of 
view, meritocracy may mean more rules and regulations.) The key-words of 
meritocratic systems are competitive examinations in recruiting, rigid hiring and 
firing policy instead of political assignments, career stability, life-time tenure, 
and internal promotion. This again creates more incentives to bypass the regu-
lations. According to one explanation, meritocracy reduces corruption because 
of longer tenure and stability, which makes people concerned about what others 
think of them (Rauch & Evans, 2000), indicating the importance of interper-
sonal trust in inhibiting corruption. The Estonian corruption study demonstrated 
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that public officials who believed that their job was valued, and who were satis-
fied with their work conditions, tenure and salary, and who believed that they 
had high status in society owing to their job, were less likely to act corruptly in 
the hypothetical situation posed in the questionnaire (Sööt, 2011). 
Low salary is frequently considered to be the driving factor for corrupt be-
haviour. There are several reasons why salary is thought to count for corruption. 
In the case of low salary the alternative cost of corruption is also low, i.e. the 
damage in case of the loss of job and in case of getting caught is smaller than in 
the case of more profitable jobs (Rijckeghem & Weder, 2001; Goudie & 
Stasavage, 1998). Low salary brings incompetent and dishonest people into 
service (Goudie & Stasavage, 1998). People who feel that their salaries are 
unfair, are more likely to engage in corrupt practices (Jain, 2001). People are 
more inclined to earn illegal income in case they earn money below their living 
conditions (Sandholtz & Koetzle, 2000).  
Next, it is argued that discretion by bureaucrats creates opportunities for cor-
ruption because of higher burdens to businesses (Jain, 2001; Stapenhurst & 
Langseth, 1997). Discretion by police to enforce particular laws makes them 
vulnerable to corruption (Newburn, 1999). Jain (2001) argues that besides ad-
ministrators corruption opportunities raise in case of discretionary powers by 
the political elite (who make public policy) and the legislature (who enact 
laws). He brings the example of privatisation which creates numerous possibili-
ties for corruption. Government monopoly and discretion of bureaucrats raised 
opportunities for corruption in Hong Kong in the advent of 1970’s (Quah, 
2010). According to another view, more state intervention and regulations fos-
ters corruption (Paldam, 2002; Carvajal, 1999; Shleifer & Vishny, 1993). Either 
way, these arguments are based on the legalistic view that over-emphasises the 
importance of legal norms in influencing corruption. Those who consider dis-
cretion as the cause of corruption, would like to see more regulations, yet the 
others would like to have less regulations in order to lessen corruption. 
Some authors find that less government equals less corruption (Goel & 
Nelson, 1998 ; Melese, 2002) – a view that is extremely popular among politi-
cians with a liberal world-view (see, for example, Kallas, 2009) and some 
scholars (Rose-Ackerman, 1999), and they recommend privatization as a solu-
tion to the corruption problem. However, such approaches fail to recognise 
private sector corruption and the fact that the process of privatization brings 
many opportunities for corruption (Jain, 2001; Goudie & Stasavage, 1998). 
Different corruption levels in the Baltic States have been attributed among other 
reasons to differences in privatization processes. For example, in Lithuania 
privatization in the 1990s was based on vouchers which meant that only those 
belonging to the close circle could privatize, while in Estonia a much larger 
group of people could be part of the privatization. This meant blockage of en-
trance to new people in the system in Lithuania, and possibility for foreign (and 
less corrupt) entries in respect of Estonia. Thus Estonia got rid of the old eche-
lon, which did not happen in the two other Baltic States. (Norkus, 2011) Shift-
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ing the difficulties of one sector to another does not sound like a reasonable 
solution. 
Corruption in the private sector can be looked at in two ways, either private-
to-public or private-to-private. In the first case it is possible to outline industries 
that are more motivated to pay bribes. The Estonian corruption survey demon-
strated that small enterprises (up to 9 employees) encounter corruption more 
often (Sööt & Vajakas, 2010). Trade and service sector seem to be most at risk 
of corruption. Businessmen working in the trade and service sector define cor-
ruption more narrowly compared to others (they did not consider listed situa-
tions as corrupt), they were more inclined to pay bribes and had been most often 
asked to pay bribes by public officials. The secondary sector (which includes 
construction) is another sector where businesses have asked to pay bribes. (Ibid) 
According to the Bribe Payers Index, the most corruption risky industries are 
public works contracts and construction, utilities, real estate, property, legal and 
business services, oil and gas, and mining (Transparency International, 2011). 
Transparency International explains the susceptibility of these sectors to bribes 
through their frequent contacts with the public sector and high-value invest-
ment.  
Speaking of private-to-private corruption, the Estonian corruption study 
showed that 9% of entrepreneurs admitted having encountered corruption inside 
their business within the previous year, i.e. the worker had misused an office, 
made unauthorized favours or similar (Sööt & Vajakas, 2010). Transparency 
International studied the frequency of private companies in paying or receiving 
bribes from other businesses (Transparency International, 2011) and found 
similar patterns as with private-to-public corruption – the sectors most affected 
were public works contracts and construction, utilities, etc. The least corrupt 
were agriculture, light manufacturing, banking and finance and forestry. 
Political parties are a type of non-governmental organizations most at risk of 
corruption because of their direct links with power and the use of public re-
sources. Again the issues of transparency and accountability rise up. According 
to one view, electoral competition endorses corruption through intraparty ri-
valry, as under open lists candidate are more interested in their personal victory, 
which makes them search for black money (Chang, 2005). According to the 
other view, political competition reduces corruption, because of the risk of 
losing one’s position due to corruption. This relationship holds especially true 
in democracies and less in other types of political regimes (Montinola & 
Jackman, 2002). Voter turnout is another variable explaining corruption. The 
study of corruption convictions in the U.S. insists that low public interest in 
politics increases corruption, as the public does not fulfil its watchdog functions 
(Johnston, 1983). The transparency of financing of political parties is a topic 
gaining a lot of attention in most European countries and elsewhere, probably 
owing to the attention paid to it by GRECO, the Council of Europe’s body 
(group of states) for countering corruption. During its evaluations it has recog-
nised the main shortcomings common to most of the evaluated countries. These 
relate to the lack of transparency of party funding (e.g. acceptance of anony-
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mous donations, confusion with declaring indirect sources of party finances like 
loans), the weakness of supervision over party financing, and the weakness of 
imposing sanctions in case of infringements (GRECO, 2012). 
 
 
3.2.3. Organizations 
Besides organizational culture (Luo, 2004) – an issue already touched upon – 
there are three elements related to organizations that create opportunities for 
corruption and determine how organizations respond to corruption. These are 
organizational structures and procedures (Abbink, 2004) and awareness of cor-
ruption (II).  
Concerning organizational structures, corruption has been defined as a 
‘hierarchical phenomenon (Bac, 1996: 277)’, referring to the ranking of author-
ity, communication and coordination in the organizations. In respect of ranks of 
monitoring, according to some, hierarchies elevate the price of corruption be-
cause the bribe runs through different layers, each wanting to have a piece of 
the cake. Another cost occurs when top levels buy the silence of others (Sajo, 
2003; Rose-Ackerman, 1999; Shleifer & Vishny, 1993). Thus according to this 
view, hierarchy makes corruption more expensive and therefore less attractive. 
However, these contradictory opinions can be summarized by pinpointing the 
importance of transparency – the transparency of decision making seems to 
overrule the number of levels of administration.  
In respect of organizational procedures, it is necessary to differentiate be-
tween occupations more open to corruption and those that have smaller oppor-
tunities for that (see below). In case of occupations with high risk, there are 
different procedures set in place to minimize corruption opportunities. For ex-
ample, staff rotation makes the success of corrupt deals less predictable, in-
creases uncertainty, and decreases (particularised) trust between different 
counterparts (Abbink, 2004). Another example is the four-eyes principle (re-
duction of the risk of bias by joint decision-making by at least two persons), 
sometimes used in the case of traffic police. It makes the corrupt deal more 
complex, as the probability of detection increases. The article ‘The Role of 
Management in Tackling Corruption’ of this thesis lists different types of 
measures the managers of the Estonian law-enforcement agencies mentioned 
most often in relation to curbing corruption in their organizations: disciplinary 
sanctions and dismissals; monitoring the work and private life of employees and 
gathering background information on them; direct enquiries by the immediate 
supervisor regarding the work and private life of his or her subordinates; open 
conduct of disciplinary and other investigations as an exemplary deterrent; 
internal financial audits; public scrutiny; the ‘four-eyes principle’; and various 
restrictions on the use of electronic databases, mobile phones, etc (I). The arti-
cle concludes that rigid, vigorous and reactive methods (the opposite of ‘soft’ 
and preventive measures) for personnel management are widespread in the 
police and other strongly hierarchical organizations. Thus it seems that control 
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methods are considered to be the most effective means of curbing corruption. 
The article concedes that although there is no exclusively right way to combat 
corruption in an organization, as some strategies are bound to work better than 
others, no strategy can enjoy lasting success without the managers leading by 
personal example. (I) 
Reporting and whistle-blower protection mechanisms are thought to elimi-
nate opportunities for corruption (Dandurand, 2007; Huberts, 1998). Organiza-
tions and countries are often encouraged to create such means by main interna-
tional organizations devoted to anti-corruption work, like Transparency Inter-
national, GRECO, OECD, the UN. Although a study on whistle-blowing 
demonstrated that organizational trust is needed for successful implementation 
of whistle-blowing policy (Holtzhausen, 2009), from another point of view, 
when perceived by organization as an instrument of denunciation, it may de-
crease generalised trust which has an inhibiting effect on corruption. This may 
hold especially true for countries with totalitarian backgrounds. However, these 
procedures may have a negative impact on public administration in general, as 
whistle-blowing and other procedural controls have caused it to become non-
risking and bureaucratic (Webb, 2012). 
Awareness of corruption is another piece in the opportunity chain of corrup-
tion through organizations. According to the Estonian corruption study, entre-
preneurs are more tolerant towards corruption compared to public sector em-
ployees – a finding which may be explained by the fact that entrepreneurs have 
not received training in ethics and their judgements about corruption are there-
fore more tolerant, while public sector employees have received systematic 
training on corruption1 (Sööt & Vajakas, 2010). 
A study of this thesis shows the prevailing view among the Estonian law-en-
forcement managers according to which the ability to resist corruption rests on 
knowing the relevant legal rules, yet, lawyers are in no way immune to corrupt 
influence (I). Although most authors writing on corruption acknowledge the 
importance of awareness about corruption (Webb, 2012; Khan, 2004; Sta-
penhurst & Langseth, 1997), very few have empirically searched its positive 
effect (the exceptions are for example Tavits, 2010 and Maenning, 2008). The 
article ‘Institutional Trust and Opinions of Corruption’ of this thesis fills the 
vacuum. It demonstrates that corruption awareness and tolerance of corrupt 
behaviour are interrelated phenomena – those who have a narrow understanding 
of corruption also tend to be more tolerant towards it. The article explains that 
people’s understanding of corruption and their modus of making value judge-
ments affects their behaviour. Thus more knowledgeable people and those less 
tolerant in judgements about corruption are less likely to behave corruptly. (II)  
 
 
                                                                          
1 Besides, methodological issues may contribute to the differences in opinions ─ in the case of the 
businesses telephone interviews were conducted, which gives respondents less time to think when 
answering questions, while in the case of public sector, web-based questionnaires were used.  
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3.2.4. Occupations 
Some occupations give more opportunities for corruption than others because of 
the power and responsibilities for finances accompanying the positions. People 
responsible for public procurement are believed to be most at risk of corruption 
(Abbink, 2004) because of business opportunities accompanying the procure-
ment – in OECD countries, public procurement accounts for 15% of GDP 
(OECD, 2007). Another occupation highly vulnerable to corruption is related to 
imposing punishments, e.g. tax administrators, inspectors, policemen, judges, 
etc (I). Abundant police corruption-related literature describes the possibilities 
of preventing police corruption (e.g. Sellbom et al, 2007; Punch, 2000; New-
burn, 1999; Poerting & Vahlenkamp, 1998). Newburn (1999) lists the main 
causes of police corruption, among which are intrinsic causes belonging to the 
job of the police and police organizations. For example, police work is de-
scribed by frequent contact with lawbreakers; low managerial supervision; legal 
opportunities for corruption; strong peer group secrecy which presumes silence 
by policemen whenever fellow policemen breach rules; etc. Besides it is be-
lieved that police corruption stems from their low salary (Hammarberg, 2012), 
while prosecutors and judges are much better paid. For reasons of discretionary 
power, customs administrators (Khan, 2004) have also been regarded as an 
occupation vulnerable to corruption. 
Deficit in the sector determines the level of corruption risk associated with 
an occupation. For example, excessive corruption in Hong Kong in 1970s was 
explained by the population growth which limited social services and govern-
ment resources (Quah, 2010). Transparency International lists on its webpage 
among its focus areas education, health, defence and security, oil and gas and 
sport. Doctors are among the occupations most often analysed in the academic 
literature in relation to corruption (e.g. Taryn et al, 2012; Peixoto et al, 2012; 
Garcia et al, 2012; Patralekha, 2012; Paredes-Solis, 2011). According to the 
Estonian corruption studies, doctors are among the three occupations where 
people have most often encountered corruption (Sööt and Vajakas, 2010), doc-
tors and nurses were also on the top list in Hungary (the Hungarian Gallup 
Institute, 1999). A corruption study focusing on the health sector was conducted 
in Estonia, which focused on corruption risk in health care, among the areas 
listed were incorrect procurement, provision of fictive certificates, conflicts of 
interest with companies importing medicines, and so on (Tartu Ülikool & Jus-
tiitsministeerium, 2011). The main reasons why health care sector is deemed 
vulnerable to corruption is because of the complexity of the health care system, 
uneven distribution of information between different parties, monopoly, etc. 
(Ibid.). According to the corruption formula, insisted by Klitgaard (1998), cor-
ruption equals with monopoly power plus discretion minus accountability. 
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3.2.5. Summary on the Opportunities for Corruption 
This chapter outlines opportunities for corruption that need to be taken into 
account when analysing the causes of corruption. The list of opportunities range 
from: clarity of the laws, independence and cleanness of the judiciary and law 
enforcement authorities, enforceability of the punishments, transparency of the 
decision making process, accountability, supervision, clarity of responsibility, 
principles of recruitment and fairness of salary, the amount of public money in 
transactions, scarce resources, power and responsibilities for finances, aware-
ness of corruption, to organizational procedures in place, to mention some. 
From the practical point of view, paying insufficient attention to any of the 
components in the opportunity chain, could account for higher levels of corrup-
tion. The researches often render contradictory results in respect of determining 
in what way a specific phenomenon can affect corruption. The discussions 
about the effect of centralisation vs decentralisation of decision making on 
corruption, about hierarchical and horizontal organisational management and 
system of public administration (meritocratic vs patronage system) on 
corruption levels are often debated in corruption-related academic literature. 
However, it is important to note that none of the elements in the framework 
can solely explain corruption, although sometimes attempts are made to find the 
one and sole factor of corruption. A country may have an excellent meritocratic-
based bureaucracy, however without civil liberties, the anti-corruption efforts 
fade in at face-painting public administration. International anti-corruption 
organizations try to fine-tune and homogenize countries’ legal system, however 
due to countries’ aversion to political and economic change, these institutions 
are often toothless in influencing the level of corruption. 
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FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION 
The introduction of this dissertation provides a theoretical framework for ana-
lysing corruption. It takes the existing structure of James William Coleman’s 
(1987) integrated theory of white-collar crime and adjusts it for explaining cor-
ruption. The advantage of this framework is its comprehensiveness in explain-
ing the causes of crime. Moreover, as there was no existing integrated theory of 
corruption, one had to adapt one. The framework consists of two main elements – 
culture and opportunities. Culture contains conditions favourable to corruption, 
while opportunities define the probability of corruption.  
 
 
Theoretical contribution of the thesis 
The empirical studies of this thesis are syntheses of qualitative and quantitative 
methodologies, a matter that could be deemed as the strength from the point of 
view of generalizability of the results. The combination of different methodolo-
gies demonstrates the possibilities for corruption research, and brings out criti-
cal points of the respective methodologies. The immediate knowledge that 
comes from ‘invading the inner territory’ of the organizations gives insights 
about the corruption-related values – an insight which is missed when using 
only quantitative methods. From another hand, quantitative methods enable 
anonymity which is necessary in gaining knowledge and honest opinions about 
corruption.  
Original studies among different case groups, i.e. public officials, law en-
forcement managers and general public enable to study corruption from differ-
ent angles, and demonstrate how trust can affect people’s opinions. Managers’ 
formal opinions about corruption hamper proactive approach towards preven-
tion, while institutional trust makes public officials’ understanding of corruption 
more meaningful. The punitive attitudes of the general public reveal their ex-
pectations towards rulers and the values the rulers put into practice. 
The three original articles of this thesis contribute to the theory of corruption 
both in respect of cultural variables and variables belonging to the opportunity 
structure of corruption. More specifically, the first study contributes to the 
overall understanding of managerial attitudes and their relation to corruption in 
an organization. Despite considerable interest among academics in the effects of 
ethical leadership styles and role-modelling on organisational culture, so far 
precious few attempts have been made to understand the values of managers in 
law enforcement agencies and the correlation of these values to corruption (I). 
The study outlines the reasons that contribute to failure of anti-corruption poli-
cies and points to the relevant general shortcomings in managerial skills. It 
improves our theoretical understanding of corruption in organizations and con-
tributes to the value-based approach to corruption.  
The second study fills a gap in the corruption theory and investigates the 
formation of moral judgements on corruption. It explores the relation between 
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awareness and intolerance of corruption. It adds to the theory by demonstrating 
how institutional trust can change people’s opinions about corruption, and not 
only the level of corruption as showed by earlier studies. Consequently it offers 
new avenues for influencing level of corruption.  
The third study adds to the theory of corruption and penology – it gives in-
sights about patterns of penal attitudes, highlighting specific drivers of penal 
attitudes in respect of corruption offenders and thieves. Misunderstanding of 
penal sentiments between policy makers, implementers and general public may 
affect penal policy in the non-desirable direction, bringing along inefficient 
implementation of the sanctions. By outlining the determinants of punitive 
attitudes towards corruption offenders (and comparatively, towards thieves), the 
study demonstrates how trust in political institutions is related to penal attitudes 
towards thieves. Yet, it also gives incentives for further studies in this area, to 
understand the ways trust can shape penal sentiments towards other types of 
offenders, and consequently penal policy. 
In terms of practical implications of this thesis, it turns out that anti-corrup-
tion policy should include influencing the understanding of managers, and 
finding ways to raise managers’ self-motivation and willingness to address anti-
corruption issues in their organizations. As the thesis pinpoints the role of in-
stitutional trust in shaping opinions, emphasis should be put on establishing 
institutions which are trusted instead of focusing on control measures and 
toughening punishments (II). Trust in institutions can be enhanced through 
raising awareness and sharing information about the tasks and aims of political 
institutions (Choon & Cheng, 2011). Transparent decision-making is another 
way to increase trust in institutions. On the other hand, public officials them-
selves are the main architects of trust – if they act ethically, trust in the institu-
tions to which they are affiliated will increase, bringing along a positive spill-
over effect (II).  
 
 
Summary of the findings to the research questions 
In order to summarize the answers to the research questions, the following con-
clusions can be made: 
 
I (What is the role of management in establishing anti-corruption organiza-
tional culture in law enforcement agencies?) 
 
The role of managers in establishing an anti-corruption organizational culture is 
by far more important than managers themselves perceive. The role of manag-
ers is to communicate desirable values to the rest of the organization, to be the 
role-model, to create conditions motivating people, set rules of recruitment, and 
so on.  
The study shows that (1) corruption is seen by managers mainly as a prob-
lem of the street level staff, (2) individual staff members’ ability to resist cor-
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ruption is considered to be determined by their knowledge of the relevant legal 
definitions and sanctions, (3) control methods are considered to be the most 
effective means of curbing corruption. The managers interviewed do not see 
themselves as the principal anti-corruption actors of their organizations. Instead, 
they regard corruption as an issue imposed on them from the outside and in a 
way that reduce them to passive players in an externally determined 
environment. This leads them to point the finger at the unstable political 
environment, to criticise ineffective legislation and to distance themselves from 
responsibility for breaches by lower-ranking officials.  
The result of such a way of thinking in practical terms is placing emphasis 
on tackling low-level corruption and preferring control methods over trust-
building methods in curbing corruption. Such preferences may cause counter-
productive results – it may demolish generalised trust. Moreover, when control 
methods or sanctions are removed, people may still continue to behave in the 
way they consider to be morally right. (I) 
 
II (What are the factors influencing attitudes towards corruption?) 
 
Differences in awareness of and opinions about corruption can be explained by 
differences in the level of institutional trust and in certain socio-demographic 
factors such as age and ethnicity (II).  
When institutions are trusted more, corruption is found less tolerable and it 
is defined more ‘accurately’. For example, those who trust more believe it is 
corruption when a businessman offers a vacation abroad to the principal of an 
elite school, expecting the principal to admit his son into the school in return. It 
was also detected that those who are less aware of corruption, are more tolerant 
towards it. It is assumed that the reason why trust is relevant in public officials’ 
awareness of corruption and the extent to which they are ready to condemn 
corruption, is because those with higher levels of trust would have higher ex-
pectations for institutions and would place more confidence in them, and there-
fore breaches of moral norms by state representatives are likely to entail a 
stronger condemnation from those who trusted them more. (II) 
It is explained in the article that younger people tolerate corruption more and 
have a less clear understanding of what is and what is not corruption, because of 
the younger generation’s cynical attitude towards state institutions. The reason 
why Estonians have less tolerance for corruption and show a better awareness 
of corruption than non-Estonians probably stems from the fact that few aware-
ness-raising campaigns have been organised for the Russian population in  
Estonia.  
 
 
 
 
 
38 
 
III  (What are the factors influencing punitive attitudes? Do these differ in 
respect of thieves and corruption offenders?) 
 
The study demonstrates that people’s sentencing preferences are harsher in the 
case of corruption offenders than in the case of thieves. This is probably be-
cause corruption offenders are perceived as being more harmful than thieves. 
The reason why they are considered more harmful can be attributed to broad 
media-coverage of corruption offences. Yet, if the options would be corruption 
offender and a violent criminal, the latter would most probably be deemed more 
harmful and deserve more severe punishment (Holtfreter et al, 2008; Rossi & 
Berk, 1997; Banks et al, 1975; Gibbons, 1969).  
The variables influencing punitive attitudes are different in respect of thieves 
and corruption offenders. Gender, ethnicity and personal income are the best 
predictors of punitive attitudes towards corruption offenders, while trust in 
politicians can explain punitive attitudes in respect of thieves. The reasons why 
those who trust politicians would like to see thieves punished less severely, is 
presumably because they are more satisfied with life and less concerned with 
the crime situation and they feel more secure and do not see criminals as threat 
to society –variables that according to earlier studies affect penal attitudes. It is 
suggested in the article that ‘penal populism as expressed in promises of harsher 
punishments is far from assured to serve its desired end – a boost in the politi-
cians’ popularity ratings’. (III) 
This does not mean that political trust does not have an effect on penal atti-
tudes concerning corruption offenders, yet, it might have through more complex 
ways. For example, it is proposed that the reason why non-Estonians would like 
corruption offenders to be punished more severely is because of alienation from 
the power, thus hinting at the lack of political trust. The article suggests in par 
with earlier studies that men are more punitive probably because they attribute 
more weight to justice while women are more compassionate. It also hypothe-
sized that the reason why older people are more intolerant of corruption offend-
ers, may be related to older people tending to hold more conservative views 
than younger people and tend to be more worried about moral decay of society. 
(III) 
 
 
Study limitations and avenues for future research 
Treisman (2000, 2007) and Jain (2001) have done a praiseworthy job and gath-
ered variables from the literature explaining corruption, and the introductory 
article of this thesis benefits from these articles as well as dozens of others who 
have empirically explained corruption. It is easy to get lost in the numerous 
amounts of contradictory studies, indicating even more to the need for general 
theoretical framework. This dissertation will not be able to include all explana-
tions on corruption, however, hopefully it succeeds to embrace the most rele-
vant ones. 
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An issue that usually lifts up in relation to corruption studies is the relative 
and culture-specific nature of the concept. The absence of integrated theory of 
corruption can be attributed to the context-dependency of the corruption studies. 
The context-dependency manifests itself mainly with regard to countries and 
organisations under research.  
 
With respect to organizations, different kinds of organizations trigger different 
opportunities for corruption. The first study of this thesis (‘The Role of Man-
agement in Tackling Corruption’) focuses on law enforcement agencies. Alt-
hough different types of law enforcement agencies exist (like police, prosecu-
tors office, etc), with their unique organizational culture and management prac-
tices, they also share some similarities. They are all established for common 
purpose – safeguarding law and order; their structure is hierarchical, and the 
study showed that they share common traits with respect to managerial ap-
proach to corruption. However testing the findings of the study in other types of 
organizational settings would help to understand, whether distancing oneself 
from responsibility, blame-shifting, down-playing the role of managers in re-
sisting corruption is prevalent mostly in law-enforcement or is a characteristic 
of the society in general. Presumably these peculiarities appear to be common 
features in young democracies and indicate an apprehension of accountability in 
general (Randma-Liiv, 2005; Verheijen, 1998). 
 
With regard to countries, many corruption studies have been conducted with the 
aim of finding the reasons of corruption in less developed countries. Privatiza-
tion and liberalization can explain corruption in certain countries, however in 
respect of other countries, which have not recently experienced privatization, 
the explanatory power of the variable remains void. The corruption studies can 
be broadly divided into two – international comparisons based on Transparency 
International’s corruption perceptions index (few others use corruption indica-
tors from other sources) or country studies. The original studies of this thesis 
fall into the second category, as all three studies have been conducted in Esto-
nia. Although this feature makes the studies unique, taking local conditions as 
the starting point and basing the conclusions of the research on how local peo-
ple perceive corruption limits the applicability of findings to other types of 
societies. Even comparisons with other post-communist states should be made 
with caution. Still, as being one of the post-communist success stories with 
relatively low levels of corruption – therefore not entirely ‘fit’ to belong to the 
group of post-Communist states – Estonia’s Soviet past influences people’s 
mindsets and behaviour (II). Therefore common traits with other post-Com-
munist societies can be found (see, for example, Karklins, 2005). The findings 
and recommendations of this thesis stem from the stabile political system, the 
contextual factor that somewhat inhibits applicability of the findings to less 
stabile and less democratic countries.  
From another angle, the context-dependence gives further incentives to study 
comparatively people’s understandings about corruption and issues related to it. 
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In order to formulate effective anti-corruption policies, it is crucial to know 
what influences people’s mindsets (II), which is the aim of the study number II 
of this thesis. The study on punitive attitudes of this thesis points to the need of 
developing a broader understanding of punitive attitudes in Eastern Europe, as 
the majority of the studies have been conducted in Anglo-American societies 
(III). Therefore similar studies in other Eastern European countries should be 
encouraged. As of more future research, the second study of this thesis (‘Insti-
tutional Trust and Opinions of Corruption’) provides an incentive for further 
examining the link between trust and ethical values (II), and the third study 
urges to further analyse mechanisms behind institutional trust and penal atti-
tudes. With regard to integrated theory of corruption, more focus on drivers for 
different types of corruption (other than bribery) could be expected, especially 
regarding private-to-private corruption. Whether one opportunity accounts for 
more than the other in explaining the level of corruption, will be another matter 
of further research. 
Finally, although context-dependency causes certain limitations to the stud-
ies, it does not prevent researchers from generalizations. Similarly, Estonia is 
not a unique isolated case that would not allow generalizations. Rather contrary, 
the findings of the original studies show that there are lots of similarities with 
other studies. The finding that low institutional trust increases permissive atti-
tudes among people has been suggested by earlier studies (Marien & Hooghe, 
2011), yet this thesis demonstrates that there is a clear connection between 
institutional trust and moral reasoning about corruption (II). Many socio-demo-
graphic variables influencing penal attitudes as well as judgements about cor-
ruption are similar to earlier studies (II, III), indicating to common patterns 
behind social phenomenon. 
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SUMMARY IN ESTONIAN 
Korruptsiooni põhjused: korruptsioonivõimalused ja 
institutsionaalne usaldus  
 
Eesmärk ja uurimisküsimused 
Viimased kakskümmend aastat on ilmunud suurel hulgal korruptsiooniteemalisi 
teadusartikleid, seega langes käesoleva doktoritöö valmimine korruptsiooni-
uuringute tippaega. Dissertatsioon põhineb autori kolmel eelretsenseeritavas 
rahvusvahelises teadusajakirjas avaldatud artiklil ning neid siduvas sissejuha-
tuses. Doktoritöö eesmärk on täiendada korruptsiooniteooriat ning seeläbi 
panustada ka praktiliselt korruptsioonivastasesse tegevusse.  
 
Töö uurimisküsimused on:  
I  Milline on õiguskaitseasutuste juhtide roll sellise organisatsioonikultuuri 
loomisel, mis tauniks korruptsiooni? 
II Millised tegurid mõjutavad inimeste suhtumist korruptsiooni? 
III  Millised tegurid mõjutavad inimeste karistushinnanguid ning kas need 
hinnangud on varaste ja korruptantide suhtes erinevad? 
 
Doktoritöö sissejuhatuse eesmärk on luua teoreetiline raamistik doktoritööle. 
Kuigi korruptsiooni olemust ja põhjuseid selgitava teaduskirjanduse hulk on 
suur, puudub seni korruptsiooni üldteooria (i.k. integrated theory). Kuna kor-
ruptsioon on valgekrae kuritegevuse vorm ning viimase puhul on üldteooria 
juba välja töötatud, siis annab see võimaluse lähtuda valgekrae kuritegevuse 
üldteooriast, kohandades seda korruptsioonile. Käesolevas sissejuhatuses on 
lähtutud James William Colemani (1987) valgekrae kuritegevust seletavast 
üldteooriast. J. W. Colemani teooria on mitmetahuline ning hõlmab nii 
indiviididest, organisatsioonidest kui ka kultuurist tulenevaid selgitusi valgekrae 
kuritegevusele (Benson & Simpson, 2009: 54). Seega on doktoritöö sissejuha-
tuses pakutud välja korruptsiooniteooria, mida oleks ehk liialt ambitsioonikas 
kutsuda korruptsiooni üldteooriaks, ent on samm viimase poole siiski. 
 
Metoodika 
Antud doktoritöö aluseks olevad kõik kolm artiklit põhinevad doktoritöö autori 
poolt läbi viidud uuringutel.  
Artikkel “The Role of Management in Tackling Corruption” („Juhtide roll 
korruptsioonivastases tegevuses“) on ainuke kvalitatiivsetel uurimismeetoditel 
põhinev uuring käesolevas dissertatsioonis, kus autor viis läbi poolstruktureeri-
tud süvaintervjuud õiguskaitseasutuste juhtidega. Andmete töötlemisel kasutati 
kriitilist diskursusanalüüsi.  
Artikli “Institutional Trust and Opinions of Corruption” (“Usaldus institut-
sioonide vastu ja hinnangud korruptsioonile”) aluseks on Eesti avalikus sektoris 
läbi viidud kvantitatiivne uuring, mille küsimustiku koostas töö autor, 
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küsitlustöö viis läbi uuringufirma TNS-Emor ning uuringut rahastas justiits-
ministeerium. Andmete analüüsimiseks kasutati regressioonanalüüsi meetodit – 
lineaarset regressiooni.  
Artikkel „Trust and Punitive Attitudes” (“Usaldus ja suhtumine karis-
tustesse”) põhineb uuringufirma GfK poolt läbi viidud Eesti elanikkonna küsit-
lusel, mille küsimustiku koostas töö autor. Andmete analüüsimisel kasutati sa-
muti regressioonanalüüsi meetodit – logistilist regressiooni.  
 
Teooria 
J. W. Colemani (1987) teooria koosneb kahest suuremast komponendist, mis 
seletavad valgekrae kuritegevuse põhjuseid – need on „kultuur“ ja „võima-
lused“ (i.k. opportunities). Kultuur võib luua soodsa tausta kuritegude toi-
mumiseks, samal ajal võimalused kas soodustavad või pärsivad kuritegu. 
Korruptsiooni puhul saab rääkida kahest peamisest kultuuripoolsest soo-
dustajast – konkurentsikultuurist ning usaldusest. Riigid, organisatsioonid ja 
inimesed tegutsevad tugevas konkurentsi ning kasumit väärtustavas keskkon-
nas, mis sunnib neid sageli vahendeid valimata leidma võimalust saada osa 
tarbimishüvedest ning suuremast kasumist (Coleman, 1987). Korruptsiooni 
soosib ka vähene usaldus riigiinstitutsioonide vastu (inimesed, kes institut-
sioone ei usalda, on ka varmamad neid petma), aga ka vähene sotsiaalne usaldus 
(vähene usaldus inimeste vahel soosib samuti petmist) ning suurem nn omade 
usaldamine (soositakse neid, kes kuuluvad „siseringi“, nt parteisse) (Uslaner, 
2001; Collins, Uhlenbruck & Rodriguez, 2009; Rothstein & Eek 2009; 
Bjørnskov, 2003; D’Hernoncourt & Méon, 2012; Marien & Hooghe, 2011).  
Kaasaegses kriminoloogilises kirjanduses selgitatakse „võimalustega“ suurt 
osa kuritegevusest (Benson et al, 2009). J. W. Colemanile tuginedes tulenevad 
korruptsioonivõimalused (1) seadustest ja nende rakendamisest, (2) sektoritest, 
(3) organisatsioonidest ja (4) ametikohtadest.  
 
Seaduste ja nende rakendamine on otseselt seotud kohtute ja õiguskaitse sõl-
tumatuse ning suutlikkusega, aga ka formaalsete ja mitteformaalsete 
sanktsioonidega. Näiteks leitakse käesolevas doktoritöös, et institutsionaalne 
usaldus ja omaks võetud normid aitavad paremini vältida korruptsiooni kui 
karistused ning kontroll (II2).  
 
Sektorite puhul saab vaadelda avaliku, era- ning kolmanda sektoriga seotud 
korruptsioonivõimalusi. Selmet öelda, et üks sektor on korruptiivsem kui teine, 
tuleks hoopis analüüsida iga sektori korruptsioonivõimalusi. Näiteks erasektori 
puhul on korruptsioonialtimad ettevõtted, millel on rohkem kokkupuuteid ava-
like finantsvahenditega.  
 
                                                                          
2 Rooma numbrid viitavad doktoritöö originaalartiklitele, mis on ära toodud ingliskeelse 
sissejuhatuse alguses. 
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Organisatsioonide korruptsioonivõimalused tulenevad organisatsioonide struk-
tuurist ja protseduuridest (Abbink, 2004) ning neis töötavate inimeste kor-
ruptsioonialasest teadlikkusest (II). Organisatsioonikultuur korruptsiooni soo-
dustava tegurina on osa laiemast kultuurilisest taustast. 
 
Ametikohtadega seoses on ameteid, mis loovad rohkem võimalusi korrupt-
siooniks kui teised. Näiteks on korruptsioonialtimad võimu ja rahalise vastu-
tusega seotud ametikohad. 
 
Kõiki neid erinevaid korruptsioonivõimalusi analüüsides on võimalik kor-
ruptsiooni olemust ning põhjuseid paremini selgitada. Valides välja vaid ühe 
võimaluse (mis on sage korruptsioonialastes teadustöödes), ei ole ühelt poolt 
võimalik korruptsiooni hästi selgitada, teiselt poolt on ka praktikas keeruline 
leida vahendeid selle vähendamiseks.  
 
Järeldused 
Autori kolm artiklit, millel käesolev dissertatsioon põhineb, aitavad selgitada 
korruptsiooni nii kultuuri kui võimaluste abil. Nimelt keskenduvad kaks artiklit 
organisatsioonidega seotud korruptsioonivõimalustele ning kolmas puudutab 
karistusi, olles seega seotud seadusi ja nende rakendamist puudutavate kor-
ruptsioonivõimalustega. Kultuuriga, mis on J. W. Colemani (1987) teooria teine 
oluline komponent kuritegude võimaluste kõrval, on otseselt seotud „usaldus“, 
mida kõikides artiklites uuritakse. Täpsemalt vaadeldakse institutsionaalse usal-
duse ja korruptsioonile antud hinnangute vahelisi seoseid (artiklis „Institutional 
Trust and Opinions of Corruption“); institutsionaalse usalduse ja karistushin-
nangute vahelisi seoseid (artiklis „Trust and Punitive Attitudes“); ning kaudselt 
usalduse tekitamist organisatsioonides (artiklis „The Role of Management in 
Tackling Corruption“).  
 
Järgnevalt on toodud kokkuvõte uurimisküsimustest: 
 
I  Milline on õiguskaitseasutuste juhtide roll sellise organisatsioonikultuuri 
loomisel, mis tauniks korruptsiooni? 
 
Uuring näitab, kuidas juhtide arusaamad soodustavad sellise organisatsiooni-
kultuuri levikut, mille tulemuseks on tähelepanu hajutamine korruptsiooni-
vastaselt tegevuselt. Eesti õiguskaitseasutuste juhtide roll korruptsioonivastase 
organisatsioonikultuuri loomisel on märksa suurem, kui juhid oma rolli selles 
tajuvad. Juhtide roll on soovitud väärtuste edasiandmine töötajatele, eeskujuks 
olemine, inimeste motiveerimiseks tingimuste loomine, värbamisreeglite paika-
panemine jne. Uuring näitab samas, et juhid ei pea ennast korruptsiooni 
ennetava kultuuri aktiivseteks loojateks juhitavates organisatsioonides. Nad 
peavad korruptsiooni hoopis väljastpoolt pealesurutud teemaks, kus juhid ise on 
vaid passiivsed osalised. See paneb juhte viitama ebastabiilsele poliitilisele 
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keskkonnale, kritiseerima puudulikke seadusi ja distantseerima ennast mada-
lama taseme ametnike seaduserikkumistest. (I) 
Leiti, et (1) juhid peavad korruptsiooni madalama taseme ametnike prob-
leemiks, (2) juhid usuvad, et võime korruptsiooni ennetada tuleneb seaduste 
tundmisest ametnike poolt, (3) juhid arvavad, et kontrollimeetmed on parim 
vahend korruptsiooni vähendamisel. Selline mõtteviis omakorda tingib õigus-
kaitseasutuste suurema rõhuasetuse madalama taseme korruptsiooni uurimisele 
ning kontrollimeetmete rakendamisele. Viimaste pikaajalises tulemuslikkuses 
võib kahelda, sest juhul kui kontroll või sanktsioon eemaldatakse, käituvad 
inimesed ikkagi endistviisi edasi – nii nagu nad peavad moraalselt õigeks. (I) 
 
II Millised tegurid mõjutavad inimeste suhtumist korruptsiooni? 
 
Uuringus vaadeldi avaliku sektori töötajaid ning leiti, et korruptsioonialast 
teadlikkust ning suhtumist korruptsiooni mõjutavad usaldus institutsioonidesse, 
vanus ja rahvus (II). Nooremate inimeste suurem sallivus korruptsiooni-
ilmingute suhtes ning madalam teadlikkus võib tuleneda nende küünilisemast 
suhtumisest riigiinstitutsioonidesse. Eestlaste vähem salliv suhtumine kor-
ruptsiooni ning suurem teadlikkus korruptsioonist (oskus korruptsiooni määrat-
leda) võrreldes mitte-eestlastega võib tuleneda sellest, et Eestis on kor-
ruptsiooniennetus olnud suunatud peamiselt eestikeelsele elanikkonnale ning 
muukeelne (venekeelne) elanikkond on sellest eemale jäänud. (II) 
Suurem usaldus institutsioonide vastu toob kaasa negatiivsema suhtumise 
korruptsiooni ning täpsema arusaamise, mis korruptsioon on. Näiteks need, kes 
usaldavad institutsioone rohkem, peavad korruptsiooniks olukorda, kui ärimees 
pakub eliitkooli direktorile tasuta puhkuse võimalust välismaal, eeldades, et 
viimane võtab ta poja vastutasuks kooli sisse. Need aga, kes korruptsiooni 
määratleda ei oska (näiteks ei arva, et viimatimainitud tegevus oleks kor-
ruptsioon), on ühtlasi selle suhtes sallivamad. Põhjus, miks usaldus mõjutab 
ametnike korruptsiooniteadlikkust ja sallimatust korruptsiooni suhtes, tuleneb 
ilmselt sellest, et usaldavamatel inimestel on ootused vastavate institutsioonide 
suhtes kõrgemad, mistõttu moraalinormide rikkumine vastavate institutsioonide 
esindajate poolt toob kaasa ka karmima hukkamõistu. (II) 
 
III  Millised tegurid mõjutavad inimeste karistushinnanguid ning kas need 
hinnangud on varaste ja korruptantide suhtes erinevad? 
 
Eesti elanikud soovivad korruptantidele karmimaid karistusi kui varastele. 
Sugu, rahvus ja vastaja sissetulek on parimad karistushinnangute prognoosijad 
korruptantide puhul, samas kui varaste puhul on selleks poliitiline usaldus. 
Põhjus, miks poliitikuid rohkem usaldavad inimesed soovivad kergemaid ka-
ristusi varastele, võib peituda nende üldiselt suuremas heaolutundes ja rahulolus 
ning väiksemas kuritegevushirmus. (III) 
Artiklis leitakse, et mitte-eestlaste suurem karistusihalus korruptantide suh- 
tes võib tuleneda nende suuremast võimust võõrandumises. Sarnaselt varase-
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mate uuringutega leitakse, et mehed soovivad karmimaid karistusi, kuna nad 
ilmselt panevad suuremat rõhku formaalsele õigusele võrreldes naistega, kes on 
pigem kaastundlikumad. Vanemate inimeste soov karmimate karistuste järele 
võib tuleneda nende konservatiivsematest väärtushinnangutest ning suuremast 
murest ühiskonna allakäigu pärast. Samas ei anna need tulemused põhjust ar-
vata, nagu poliitiline usaldus ei mõjutaks korruptantidele antavaid karistushin-
nanguid, vaid selle taga võib olla keerulisem suhe. Näiteks üks põhjus, miks 
mitte-eestlased sooviksid karmimaid karistusi korruptantidele võrreldes 
eestlastega, võib tuleneda nende võimust võõrandumises, seega viidates kaud-
selt poliitilise usalduse puudumisele. Kokkuvõttes viitab uuring sellele, et po-
liitikud, kes soovivad oma populaarsusreitinguid kasvatada, ei pruugi seda saa-
vutada läbi karistuste karmistamise lubamise. (III)  
 
Doktoritöö panus korruptsiooniteooriasse 
Doktoritöö aluseks olevates originaaluuringutes on kasutatud nii kvanti-
tatiivseid kui kvalitatiivseid uurimismeetodeid, mis on kasulikud uuringu-
tulemuste üldistamise seisukohalt. Erinevate meetodite kasutamine võimaldab 
kriitiliselt hinnata vastavate meetodite plusse ja miinuseid. Teadmisi, mida 
saadakse organisatsioonijuhtide vahetust süvitsi intervjueerimisest, ei ole või-
malik omandada kvantitatiivsete meetoditega, samas kui viimased pakuvad 
võimalusi anonüümseteks arvamusavaldusteks korruptsiooni kohta, mis kor-
ruptsiooni uurimise seisukohalt on äärmiselt oluline uurimisaines.  
Kolme eri tüüpi sihtrühma uurimine (organisatsioonijuhid, avaliku sektori 
töötajad ning tavaline elanikkond) võimaldab samuti korruptsiooni uurida 
erinevast vaatenurgast ning näitab, kuidas usaldus võib mõjutada arvamusi. 
Juhtide formaalsed arusaamad korruptsiooni kohta takistavad aktiivset kor-
ruptsiooniennetust, samas kui usaldus institutsioonidesse muudab töötajate 
arusaama korruptsioonist sisukamaks. Elanikkonna karistushinnangud aga pee-
geldavad nende ootusi valitsejate suhtes ning kaudselt ootusi väärtuste suhtes, 
mida viimased evivad. 
Kuna siiani on vähe uuritud õiguskaitseasutuste juhtide korruptsioonialaseid 
arusaamasid, siis aitab esimene uuring paremini aru saada juhtide rollist kor-
ruptsiooni vältiva organisatsioonikultuuri loomisel. Lisaks aitab see paremini 
mõista, miks korruptsioonivastane poliitika võib ebaõnnestuda ning panustab 
kokkuvõttes väärtuspõhise korruptsiooni ennetava organisatsioonikultuuri 
loomisesse. (I) 
Teine uuring täidab lünga korruptsiooniteoorias ning keskendub kor-
ruptsiooniga seotud hinnangutele. Artiklis näidatakse, kuidas usaldus institut-
sioonidesse mõjutab inimeste arusaamasid korruptsioonist, mitte üksnes kor-
ruptsioonitaset, nagu on leitud varasemates uuringutes. Kokkuvõttes pakub see 
uuring uusi võimalusi korruptsiooni vähendamiseks. (II) 
Kolmas uuring panustab korruptsiooni- ja karistusteooriasse. Artiklis näi-
datakse, millised tegurid võivad mõjutada inimeste karistushinnanguid. 
Arusaam, kes millist karistust vääriks, sõltub nii vastaja tunnustest (usaldusest, 
rahvusest, soost) kui ka kurjategijast (kas tegemist on korruptandi või vargaga). 
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Uuring näitab, et poliitikute usaldamine on oluline tegur karistushinnangute 
andmisel varastele, samas kui korruptantidele antavate karistushinnangute puhul 
usaldus statistiliselt olulist rolli ei mängi. Seega vajab institutsionaalse ja 
poliitilise usalduse ning karistushinnangute vaheline seos veel edaspidiseid 
põhjalikumaid analüüse. (III) 
Doktoritöös soovitatakse suunata korruptsioonivastast poliitikat rohkem juh-
tide arusaamade mõjutamisele ning keskenduda juhtide motivatsiooni tõst-
misele korruptsiooni ennetava kultuuri loomisel organisatsioonis. Selle asemel, 
et ehitada kontrollile ja karistusele põhinevaid organisatsioone, tuleks suuren-
dada usaldust institutsioonidesse (II). Doktoritöö näitab, et institutsionaalne 
usaldus mõjutab nii korruptsioonialast teadlikkust kui ka karistushinnanguid 
(viimast siiski vaid varaste puhul). Usaldust saab suurendada poliitiliste institut-
sioonide rolli ja tegevuse kohta käiva informatsiooni jagamise kaudu (Choon & 
Cheng, 2011). Otsustusprotsesside läbipaistvus aitab suurendada usaldust ning 
vähendada korruptsiooni. Teisalt on organisatsioonide töötajad ise peamised 
usalduse loojad – kui nemad käituvad eetiliselt, siis tõuseb usaldus ka nende 
organisatsioonide vastu, kus nad töötavad (II).  
 
Doktoritöö piirangud ning uurimisideid edasiseks 
Käesoleva doktoritöö sissejuhatavas osas on kasutatud erinevate autorite 
empiirilisi uuringuid korruptsioonist. Korruptsiooni kohta on läbi viidud palju 
vastuolulisi uuringuid, mille põhjal kindlaid väiteid uuringutulemuste univer-
saalse rakendatavuse kohta on raske leida.  
Korruptsioon on kultuurispetsiifiline nähtus. Osaliselt võib ka korruptsiooni 
üldteooria puudumist põhjendada selle nähtuse kultuurispetsiifilisusega. Kor-
ruptsiooni definitsiooni kultuurispetsiifilisus avaldub nii organisatsioonide kui 
riikidega seoses. 
 
Organisatsioonidega seoses on võimalik tuua näide õiguskaitseasutuste, minis-
teeriumite ja eraettevõtete erinevuste kohta – kõigis neis tekivad erinevad 
võimalused korruptsiooniks. Käesoleva doktoritöö ühe uuringu (I) keskmeks on 
õiguskaitseasutuste juhid, mistõttu on küsitav uuringutulemuste laiendamine 
teist tüüpi organisatsioonidele. Uuringu kordamine teistsugust tüüpi organi-
satsioonides aitaks paremini mõista, kas suutmatus võtta vastutust, süüdistada 
olusid ning mitte mõista oma rolli korruptsioonipoliitika kujundajatena oma 
organisatsioonis, on omane eelkõige õiguskaitseasutustele või iseloomustab see 
kogu Eesti ühiskonda. Eeldatavalt on sellised juhtide omadused levinud just 
väljakujunemata demokraatiaga ühiskondades (Randma-Liiv, 2005; Verheijen, 
1998). 
 
Rääkides riikidest, siis suurem osa korruptsiooniuuringutest on läbi viidud 
eesmärgiga selgitada korruptsiooni põhjuseid vähemarenenud riikides. Erasta-
mine kui „korruptsioonivõimalus“ seletab korruptsiooni teatud riikides, samas 
jääb selle muutuja selgitusjõud nõrgaks riikide kohta, kus erastamist toimunud 
ei ole. Korruptsiooniuuringud võib laias laastus jagada kaheks –rahvusvahelised 
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Transparency Internationali korruptsioonitajumise indeksi põhjal koostatud 
võrdlevad uuringud ning riigikesksed juhtumiuuringud. Käesoleva doktoritöö 
aluseks olevad uuringud kuuluvad teise gruppi, kuna kõik need on läbi viidud 
Eestis. Ühelt poolt on see eeliseks, kuna originaaluuringuid selles vallas on 
Eesti kohta väga vähe, kuid teisalt peitub siin ka nõrkus. Nimelt, lähtudes 
uuringus vaid (ühe) riigipõhisest korruptsioonimääratlusest (kuidas kohalikud 
elanikud korruptsiooni määratlevad), võib see uuringutulemuste laiema üldis-
tusvõime seada kahtluse alla. Ka võrdlus teiste postkommunistlike riikidega on 
raskendatud korruptsiooni mõiste spetsiifilisuse pärast. Samas, kuigi Eesti on nö 
postkommunistlik edulugu, mõjutab nõukogude minevik inimeste arusaama ja 
käitumist, mistõttu võib eeldada sarnaseid tulemusi võrreldes teiste sarnase 
minevikuga riikidega ka korruptsiooniuuringute puhul (vt nt Karklins, 2005).  
Doktoritöö uuringud on läbi viidud stabiilses poliitilises keskkonnas, 
mistõttu nende tulemusi ei saa otse üle kanda vähem stabiilsetele ja vähem 
demokraatlikumatele ühiskondadele.  
Kultuurispetsiifilisus annab põhjust uurida võrdlevalt inimeste arusaamasid 
korruptsioonist erinevates riikides. Selleks, et töötada välja toimivaid kor-
ruptsioonivastaseid poliitikaid, tuleb mõista inimeste arusaamu, mis on 
käesoleva doktoritöö üheks eesmärgiks (II). Kolmanda, karistushinnanguid 
käsitleva uuringu tulemused viitavad vajadusele uurida karistushinnanguid ka 
mujal Ida-Euroopas, kuna valdav osa valdkonna uuringutest on tehtud Anglo-
Ameerika riikides (III). Samuti viidatakse doktoritöös vajadusele uurida 
täpsemalt institutsionaalse usalduse ja eetiliste väärtuste omavahelist seost (II).  
Edasiste uuringute puhul tuleks korruptsiooni üldteooria edasiarendamist 
eesmärgiks pidades välja selgitada, kas mõni korruptsioonivõimalus on olu-
lisem kui teine, teisisõnu ─ tuleks uurida, kas muutujatel on erinev kaal kor-
ruptsioonitaseme selgitamisel. Teiseks, kuna valdav osa korruptsioonialastest 
empiirilistest uuringutest keskenduvad vaid altkäemaksule kui ühele korrupt-
sioonivormile, siis oleks edaspidi vajalik uurida ka teisi korruptsioonivorme, 
eriti erasektori omi. Samuti vajaks edasist analüüsi institutsionaalse usalduse 
ning karistushinnangute vahelised seosed. 
Kokkuvõttes, kultuurispetsiifilisusele vaatamata on läbiviidud uuringute 
põhjal võimalik teha ka teatud üldistusi. Eesti ei ole isoleeritud riik, vaid pigem 
näitavad doktoritöö tulemused, et Eestil on korruptsioonivaldkonnas sarnaseid 
jooni mitmete teiste riikidega. Näiteks varasemate uuringute järeldus, et madal 
institutsionaalne usaldus toob kaasa “minnalaskmise meeleolusid” inimestel 
(Marien & Hooghe, 2011), leiab kinnitust ka käesolevas töös, kus leitakse, et 
institutsionaalse usalduse ja korruptsiooni kohta antavate hinnangute vahel on 
otsene seos (II). Paljud sotsiaaldemograafilised muutujad, mis selgitavad nii 
karistushoiakuid kui korruptsiooni (II, III), kinnitavad varasemate uuringute 
tulemusi, viidates seega teatud universaalsele mustritele inimeste hoiakutes. 
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Presentation on Social Trust and Opinions of Corruption (XXIII rd annual con-
ference of the Baltic criminologists „Crime and Punishment in the Baltic 
Region”, Lithuania – Vilnius, 22–23.10.2010). 
Presentation on Why conduct a study when it is possible without it. An 
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